Tag Archives: 2924a

The Inadvertent Message of Gomes v. Countrywide: File Bankruptcy First—Shift the Burden of Proof in Foreclosure, all debt collection cases

2011 Comm. Fin. News. 18
Commercial Finance Newsletter
Professor Dan Schechtera
February 28, 2011
Borrower Cannot File Suit to Determine Whether MERS Has Authority to Commence Foreclosure, and Trust Deed Expressly Authorized MERS to Do So. [Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,(Cal.App.).]
A California appellate court has held that a borrower questioning the authority of MERS to commence a nonjudicial foreclosure cannot file suit to determine whether MERS has the authority to do so; in addition, the deed of trust executed by the borrower expressly authorized MERS to conduct the foreclosure. [Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2011 WL 566737 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 2011).]
Facts
A California borrower executed a deed of trust, in which Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was designated as the nominee for the lender. Following the borrower’s default, an agent acting on behalf of MERS initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The borrower filed suit challenging the authority of MERS to act on behalf of the underlying owner of the note and deed of trust. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed.
Reasoning
The court held that the borrower had no factual basis for believing that MERS lacked authority to act on behalf of the beneficial owner of the note and deed of trust, and there was no statute permitting a private action seeking to determine whether MERS had such authority. As a fallback, the court also held that MERS did, indeed, have the authority to initiate a foreclosure, under the express terms of the deed of trust.
In holding that MERS had the authority to conduct the foreclosure, the court declined to follow Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 216 P.3d 158 (2009), holding that MERS had no standing to intervene in a foreclosure case (and, by implication, that MERS was simply irrelevant to the foreclosure process). The court noted that under Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1), “[t]he trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents shall first file… a notice of default.” Therefore, since MERS was an “authorized agent,” it necessarily acted properly in commencing the foreclosure.
Author’s Comment
By holding that the borrower could not even file suit in state court in order to determine whether the proper party had commenced the foreclosure, the court has sent a clear (and perhaps inadvertent) message to borrowers and their attorney’s: instead of filing suit in state court, file a bankruptcy petition. That shifts the burden to the creditor, who will have to file a motion for relief from stay in the bankruptcy court and will have to establish its right to foreclose as part of that motion. Unlike the California state courts, the California bankruptcy courts have been critical of poorly documented mortgage transactions and sloppily conducted foreclosure proceedings.
As to the substantive issue, i.e., whether MERS really has the authority to act on behalf of the lender, the case law is decidedly mixed. The cases in California tend to be more sympathetic to MERS, while the cases in much of the rest of the nation are much less deferential to MERS. For discussions of some of those cases, see:
  • – 2010 Comm. Fin. News. 51, Foreclosure Is Valid Because MERS Has Power to Designate New Trustee Under Deed of Trust, Even Though It Holds No Interest in Underlying Note.
  • – 2009 Comm. Fin. News. 103, Assignee of Mortgage Lacks Standing to Foreclose Because Assignee Failed to Show That MERS Assigned Underlying Promissory Note, Along with Mortgage.
  • – 2009 Comm. Fin. News. 59, Assignees of Mortgages Cannot Enforce Unendorsed Notes in Their Possession Because MERS Documentation Does Not Expressly Authorize Assignment of Notes.
  • – 2009 Comm. Fin. News. 57, Assignee in Possession of Mortgage Note May Not Enforce It Because Note Is Not Endorsed to Assignee.
  • – 2008 Comm. Fin. News. 104, Mortgagee May Not Obtain Relief from Automatic Stay in Order to Foreclose When Necessary Evidence Is Supplied by Low-Level Clerk Without Personal Knowledge of Underlying Facts.
  • – 2008 Comm. Fin. News. 95, Mortgage Assignee’s Failure to Record Assignment Does Not Empower Mortgagor’s Trustee in Bankruptcy to Avoid Underlying Mortgage.
  • – 2008 Comm. Fin. News. 86, Mortgagee’s Agent May Not Foreclose if Agent Cannot Properly Trace Assignment of Mortgage from Original Lender to Assignee Pursuant to Securitization.
  • – 2007 Comm. Fin. News. 93, Mortgage Holder Seeking Relief from Automatic Stay in Order to Foreclose May Be Denied Relief for Failure to Establish Chain of Title from Loan Originator to Ultimate Assignee.

Copyright Thomson Reuters

Footnotes

These materials were written by Dan Schechter, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of Professor Schechter.
End of Document © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

The Futility of Individualized Resistance to Collectivization: the Foreclosure Crisis is Government Policy in Action, Securitization is the Banks’ Communistic Mechanism for Confiscation

I want to deliver a very short and bitter message here: individual case litigation strategies have failed and are doomed to continued failure.  EVERY PERSON who wants to fight in court for his or her family home in Court in California must include a Constitutional Challenge to the Non-Judicial Foreclosure System and all the component statutes, but even this is not enough: the remedy is political action.  Until these statutes and the nation-wide socialistic policies which support them are obliterated, which can be reliably expected to happen ONLY through political rather than judicial action, the institutions of private property and the home-based family will continue to erode and disintegrate.  

Without MASSIVE LEGAL REFORM, there is no hope that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” will not be continually violated as it has been in millions of cases nationwide.  These mass foreclosure and eviction policies have been approved and strategies formulated by the government at the highest levels.  

(That was the short brief and very bitter message—all the rest that follows is an elaboration on these points).

I am writing today to announce firmly that I think that everyone involved in the “Anti-Foreclosure” guerilla resistance is and has been misguided, myself included.  We have to stop thinking, or even looking for ways, to succeed on an individual, case-by-case basis.  We have to organize as a community whose wealth and values are under siege.  Offering potential strategies or hypothetical solutions to individuals is just “wrong” and we’ve got to give it up.  We must organize like the abolitionists before 1861, like the labor unions from the 1880s-1920s, like the real civil rights activists of the 1950s-60s.  All our “gurus” and sources of individual advice regarding individual and isolated action, from the cosmically brilliant Neil Garfield on his wonderful “Living Lies” website, down the hierarchy through local geniuses like April Carrie Charney and Malcolm Doney in Florida, Charles Koppa and Catherine Bryan in Orange and San Diego Counties, California all the way down to Theresa Moore and Robert Garvin in Studio City and finally Peyton and me have just had it all wrong—–we have been doing more harm than good.  

We are all either engaging in false hopes or blindly misleading people to think that we can stop the seizure of homes and property in any sort of systematic way through litigation and the court system.  

Worse than that, by offering false hopes to people and engaging in one losing court-battle after another, we have been bolstering and shoring up the success of the corporate-banking enemies.

What I am writing today is that the individual case-litigation approach is a massive failure even to slowing the rates of foreclosure and eviction in California or anywhere else.  Even in Florida, at best “Anti-Foreclosure Guerillas” like April Carrie Charney, Malcolm Doney and Catherine Bryan can claim very if outright victories other than temporary delay in a small percentage, not even a statistically significant minority of foreclosures or evictions.  

The individual case strategy cannot be used to eradicate what is a society-wide systemic cancer created by the politically tempting bait of “easy credit” which was, after all, the original communist-socialist demand of the mid-to-late nineteenth century.

Because “easy credit” is by definition based on wants and desires rather than actual wealth or production, “easy credit” is the antithesis of capitalism or any sound economic system, but it sure is popular if you’re a politician….  When they said that Communism works through the ways and means of the devil, they weren’t kidding: the theory that temptation has been the path to sin and death since the Garden of Eden is not actually “just a theory” but a fairly demonstrable fact.

Even coordinated constitutional litigation cannot work because I do not think we can every achieve statewide in California, much less nationwide, anything like what I tried and failed to achieve in the family courts in Williamson County Texas in 2005-7.  What I tried in Georgetown, Texas, was to try to arouse and incite enough popular discontent and cooperative participant action among parents that we might close down the system.  I came close enough that Judge James F. Clawson commented on the fact that if he did not ban me from further litigation in the state of Texas, I would have closed down the Family Law Courts.  

But in fact we did not come anywhere close to permanently shutting down the courts by flooding them with protests and constitutionally demanding civil rights motions and litigation maneuvers.  We just got labelled “paper terrorists.”  Ok, Assistant Texas A.G. James Carlton Todd and his boss Mr. Greg Abbott actually called me “the most dangerous paper terrorist in Texas”—but that dubious distinction plus $5.00 is barely enough to buy you a coffee and pound cake at Starbucks these days.

Given the scale of the foreclosure crisis—Millions in California alone—tens of millions nationwide—1.5 million abandoned and empty homes in Florida—we have to recognize this as a problem much bigger than any of us as individuals.  

Slavery was not abolished by helping individual slaves escape through the “underground railroad” or even through individual plantation-owners granting manumission by will to hundreds or thousands of slaves upon their deaths by will.  

Decent wages in factories were never achieved by individualized negotiation for “modifications” of employment contracts—only by COLLECTIVE ACTION on the part of organized labor unions—and that is what we need in the foreclosure arena.  And in doing so we have to recognize that we face, just like the operators of the underground railway did, just as the early leaders of the labor movement did in the 1880s-1890s, the possibility of arrest and even armed suppression of our movement.  (Compare the “Haymarket Riot” in Chicago on May 4, 1886 and the much larger and more widespread Pullman Riots, also centered in Chicago but Nationwide, in the summer of 1894.)

So if we REALLY oppose collectivization of private property we cannot do so individually, we cannot oppose the government one-on-one, unless we do so as “We the People” acting politically and in concert.  To this end I would ask for contributions to take out full – page ads in the Los Angeles Times and advertise on television and radio as well as the internet.  ”CALIFORNIA FORECLOSURE LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL—TAKE BACK YOUR RIGHTS BEFORE THEY TAKE YOUR HOME, IF YOUR HOME HAS BEEN TAKEN, TAKE BACK YOUR RIGHTS AND YOUR HOME.

We must clearly articulate our position that: we know that the Foreclosure Crisis is Government Policy in Action, Securitization is the Banks’ Communistic Mechanism for Confiscation, and we demand an end to both the governmental policy and the (ironic as it might seem) banks’ confiscation of property by securitization.  

The outward trappings of capitalism have become the instruments of communistic confiscation and expropriation of homes and the destruction of families.  This will only end when the people demand it to end—and the Courts are not the proper arenas to do this. Courts in the United States and Europe, all known judicial systems, really, are designed at best to correct (or compensate) small variant problems and deviations from established norms.  

We who OPPOSE foreclosure and eviction, who DEMAND adherence to the common law and constitutional norms respecting contract and the right to own property according to contractual terms and rights, WE are the deviants now, and it is UP TO US to bring the law into conformity.  It is a tall order, but it is the only way we can reclaim our heritage and our RIGHTS to property—even when so much property has already been lost or destroyed.

Courts can only act as mechanisms for the imposition of widespread social and cultural change when they are expressly delegated this purpose by the political branches, as they have been during the racial civil rights movements 1948-1972 and the less well-publicized but even more historically significant family and domestic relations “reformulations” involving no fault divorce, abortion, and “sexual liberation” generally during the period starting not later than 1962 and continuing until the present time.  

Ironically, for all its internal contradictions, for all that it was an incomplete movement which only raised up one part of society by dragging down another, upgraded some statements of rights while degrading others, some of the best pro freedom statements and constitutional formulations of the law as written today owe their origins to the American Civil Rights movement.  

The civil rights movements of both the 1860s-70s (though mostly constitutional and statutory) and 1950s-60s (mostly judicial) had many positive components and results which were actually pro-freedom and anti-communist (although the movement itself was widely labelled as “communistic” by many opponents during the twentieth century—I often retell the story that among my earliest memories of highway driving in Texas and Louisiana were the “Impeach Earl Warren” signs all throughout the South and Southwest in the late 1960s).  

Again ironically, the “sexual liberation” movement and now the mortgage foreclosure crisis have undone many of the positive, pro freedom, effects of the civil rights movement by creating new forms of oppression (as indeed have some statutory civil rights programs—as distinct from a strong majority of the judicial decisions of the civil rights quarter century noted, 1948-1972).  

But the mortgage foreclosure crisis appears to be completing what was worst in both the civil rights and sexual liberation movements: the final destruction of the home-based family and stable neighborhood community.  In fact, it is fair to say that, on the populist activist level, it would now be impossible to have a civil rights movement analogous to the one that started after World War II, because NO COHERENT COMMUNITIES OF ANY POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT SIZE REMAIN IN AMERICA TODAY—we are truly a nation of transients).

For fifteen years now, since 1996, I have been involved almost continuously in Civil Rights litigation of one species or another against State and Corporate abuses of individual rights and personal autonomy, against takings of liberty & property without due process of law.  I started off fighting the Sheriffs and Police Departments in Central Texas, disputing their claims of “qualified immunity” to abuse the rights and autonomy of people on a random and unsystematic basis, almost like criminals or terrorists.  I then graduated to believing the problem took a more systematic form with a plan to destroy the individual and family regularly and predictably, and that the root of problem lay with judicial immunity and the Court system, especially the Family or Domestic Relations Courts.  I still believe that at both levels, our local, state, and national institutions have betrayed their birthright in liberty.

Since 2006, my focus has been primarily against the mortgage finance and credit systems.  During these five years’ time I have researched and experimented with many varieties of theories or approaches to common-law (and commercial code) holder-in-due-course doctrine, privity of contract, quiet title, securities fraud, and other pro-consumer, pro-buyer, theories.  I have tried and tested such theories at the very least in Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Colorado, Idaho, Washington, Arizona, Nevada, and (most intensely of all since 2008) California.   I know that, logically and rationally, all these theories are either correct in some absolute or historical or logical sense, but they do not work in Court in ANY SORT OF PREDICTABLE WAY. What this means is that, as a matter of any individual’s “reasonable expectation”, there is no adequate remedy at law or in equity, there is only the occasional, seemingly almost random, single decision in a thousand or so that goes the way of the owner consumer.  This is not a matter of “legal victory”, this is a matter of “playing the odds” at Roulette or Blackjack, much worse than betting on racecars, ponies, thoroughbreads, or greyhounds whose mechanical design and/or natural and innate skills can be rated and assessed objectively.

In the past five years, no two cases or situations have ever been exactly alike, but the pattern is always the same: the decks in the courthouses across the nation are stacked against the homeowner/consumer/buyer/ “borrower” or “credit applicant/credit user.”   I feel I fairly competently understand the law in only five states at the present time: California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas (although all the Ninth Circuit States—Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Washington—are by conscious historical design pretty close in design and execution of statutory scheme to California).   In Florida and New Jersey, the law is EXCELLENT, in that foreclosure and eviction are both by the clear requirement of the law judicial in nature, and common law modified by the commercial code is all that counts.  Yet the rate of foreclosure is astronomical in both states.  In Florida, they are dragging judges out of retirement to preside over the foreclosure epidemic in the state with the flimsiest houses (owing to both construction and lack of regular winter weather) and the nation’s longest tradition of continuous real estate fraud.  In New Jersey, there is a moratorium on foreclosure proceedings until the system “can catch up with itself” whatever that means.  

In California, the worst laws in the country are fueling the worst foreclosure epidemic anywhere in history.  I have written extensively about California Civil Code §§2924 et seq., especially 2924a, 2924i, and the related “attorney conspiracy” limitations of §1714.10.  Michigan and Texas are both “mixed” systems where judicial and non-judicial foreclosure are authorized by law, but non-judicial foreclosure has become the norm in the past decade.

It was only when I came to California in 2008 that I began to realize for certain what was really going on, and what is really going on is that the United States Government, and State Governments with more-or-less enthusiasm, are cooperating with banks and finance companies to abolish private property and turn ownership of all private interests to a state-controlled governmental-corporate conglomerate along the lines originally suggested in Karl Marx’ and Frederick Engels’ Communist Manifesto of 1848.  

      In some very real ways, the most disturbing results come from Massachusetts.  To the same degree that I believe that the Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loan case (121 CalRptr3d 819 OPINION Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans Inc Feb_18_2011) illustrates the utter futility of fighting within the law of California—(when the law itself is the enemy and unconstitutional wall-to-wall), I had thought that the Ibanez case in Massachusetts showed a glimmer of sanity and light on the East Coast US Bank Nat Ass’n v Ibanez 458 Mass 637 941 NE2d 40 (Massachusetts 2011).  Peyton’s research in Massachusetts last month (May 2011) has brought evidence to my attention that Ibanez in fact had nothing whatsoever to do with securitization and that Massachusetts law appears to expressly permit the separation of ownership of the note and ability to collect on the mortgage, and has done so for approximately 100 years.  In particular, two sections of its general laws make Massachusetts appear as bad or even worse than California in terms of its statutory scheme, although Massachusetts generally has a much “kinder and gentler” set of consumer protection laws § 9-609 Secured Party’s Right to Take Possession After Default UCC 106 Art 9 GENERAL LAWS of MASSACHUSETTS and § 9-607 Collection and Enforcement by Secured Party (these are all part of the “gentle, gradual” transition to socialism which deceptively gives the—entirely false— appearance of respect for individual rights).  The “Uniform Commercial Code Comment” for 1999 Main Volume appears to confirm that the note and mortgage may be separated in Massachusetts by stating: 

“6. Relationship to Rights and Duties of Persons Obligated on Collateral. This section permits a secured party to collect and enforce obligations included in collateral in its capacity as a secured party. It is not necessary for a secured party first to become the owner of the collateral pursuant to a disposition or acceptance.”

In other words, Massachusetts Law addresses by editing the Uniform Commercial Code what would otherwise is and should remain one of the strongest common law (and in fact, “normal” commercial code) explanations for why securitized mortgages are (everywhere else) facially illegal. It is widely known that Massachusetts and California are two of the most “socialist-tending” states in the Union—so the Ibanez case as originally (apparently, COMPLETELY misinterpreted) was a major surprise.  See also the Boston Bar Journal Comment on the case: Boston Bar Journal US BANK v IBANEZ THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY’S DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES IN FOCUS, and for the disconnection between Massachusetts law and the rest of the United States Concerning the necessary that “note and mortgage travel together” see the Westlaw Journal Article published on Valentine’s Day: 02-14-2011 IBANEZ A 19TH-CENTURY DECISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.  

Now, regardless of whether California or Massachusetts has the WORST foreclosure law “on the books” the simple truth is that the law, and the way that the law is consistently applied by the courts—is the primary problem—NOT “robo signing” by the banks, NOT any of the faults or practices of the banks at all in fact—because if the Courts would enforce the common law and constitution against the financial industry, criminal and civil violations would be recognized and dealt with as such.  The problem is that the law and the Courts have effectively IMMUNIZED the Banks and financial institutions pursuant to an express government policy—very succinctly and clearly, and unambiguously identified, articulated, and described in the California Gomes opinion attached above, from February 18, 2011, that California public policy favors quick and easy foreclosure.  Foreclosure has thus become a kind of “kindly manner” of execution in this “Brave New World” in which we now live.  (Compare G.B. Shaw’s Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism” which explains: 

…under Socialism…..you would be forcibly fed, clothed, lodged, taught, and employed whether you liked it or not.  If it were discovered that you had not the character and industry enough to be worth all this trouble, you might possibly be executed in a kindly manner; but whilst you were permitted to live you would have to live well.”)

One repeating mantra of the “easy credit” society is that “living well is the best revenge” but appears that in a Socialist Society—others (namely the Corporate/Governmental Intelligencia) has the power to decide on our behalf what constitutes good living.  Obviously, the choice to live austerely in the desert and contemplate truth, like the early Christian monastics known as “The Desert Fathers” would be off limits/impermissible.  I suppose “living well” means buying at shopping malls, living in government/corporate allocated housing which will be awarded based on the degree of your conformity with government/corporate policy—whatever that is—which determines whether you have or have not the character and industry enough to be worth all this trouble.”

Getting to these conclusions and understanding what’s going on has been a long and fairly painful process…..

       It is still less than ten years since, on my son Charlie’s tenth birthday, California Attorney Deborah S. Gershon, then Vice-President and General Counsel of AAMES Home Loan, Inc., informed me that AAMES could not modify any Home Loans because the notes at all been pooled and securitized.  Following up, I now find that Deborah S. Gershon (according to her profile with the California State Bar) is employed by and affiliated with another subprime lender: “Signature Group Holdings, Inc.” (owner of “Signature Capital Advisers, LLC, Fremont Credit Corporation and Fremont Investment & Loan Bank of California).  This is very interesting because Fremont Investment & Loan went through bankruptcy reorganization a couple of years ago as a direct result of some early “foreclosure crisis” litigation in Massachusetts relating to predatory lending in the sub-prime field.  See, e.g., http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/452/452mass733.html (452 Mass. 733, 2008) and also, Attorney General Martha Coakley’s press release on her $10MM settlment http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2009_06_09_fremont_agreement&csid=Cago   In short, Deborah S. Gershon has dedicated her life to the securitization of mortgages and related financial and legal endeavors.  It is apparently a very good business, and a very good line of work.  Those who had the foresight to join in that movement deserve the same respect as those who saw that the Bolsheviks were destined to rule Russia after the 1917 Revolution, that Mao Tse-Tung would triumph over Chiang Kai-shek (aka Jiǎng Jièshí or Jiǎng Zhōngzhèng in Mandarin), and that Saigon would ultimately fall to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (for the Vietnamese aftermath, seehttp://www.eng.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/eng/news/default.aspx?cat_id=513&news_id=12053#content “Scientific seminar on President Ho Chi Minh and the road to national salvation”).

AAMES was a pioneer in home equity loans, starting an advertising program in the late 1970s (Carter Administration) which included some fairly interesting and or amusing ads, see for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjTzEzNT7_M&NR=1http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJgB335zLfc&NR=1http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cp5STpiAwt0.  AAMES is thus one of the earliest criminal enterprises which insinuated the concept of Easy Home Credit through the Yellow Pages into the American Consciousness as a vehicle of expanding credit regardless of productivity and wealth or REAL need—and AAMES’ was a mover in reshaping Federal and State laws to allow for the extension of such loans and the consequent expropriation of homes without due process of law.  

In one sense, the American people bear full responsibility for and complicity in this crisis up to the present time.  More certainly even than that the Germans voted Hitler and the Nazi Party into power in not one fluke but two successive national elections in 1932 and 1933, the Americans have repeated voted the supporters of easy credit and punitive and confiscatory policies leading to the expropriation of property into power.  The destruction of Germany under Hitler and during World War II, then was guaranteed by only two elections.  

The Americans have been voting soft-sell corporate socialists into power continuously for 76 years since 1932, with increasingly express enthusiasm since at least 1970 (the last “real” anti-communists to receive any electoral votes for the Presidency were Barry Goldwater in 1964 and George Wallace in 1968).  The election of 2008 saw the first election of the first avowedly, admittedly socialist President in U.S. History, and major magazine articles discussed his commitment to socialism with fanfare as “Cover” articles, but little actual controversy.  And the greatest irony was that there was not one IOTA of difference between the “avowedly socialist” policies of President Barack Hussein Obama and the “Conservative Republican” policies of George Walker Bush—Obama has yet to introduce a single policy without precedent in his predecessor’s administration more significant than his “cash for clunkers” program.  (“Obamacare” has actually been “in the works” since 1993 during Hillary’s first term in the White House….. yes, if Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky made anything clear about Bill Clinton, it was that if anyone was wearing the pants in the White House during the first term, it certainly was NOT him….and in fact Hillary’s support for health care reform back then was well-known and publicized).  

The highly controversial “individual mandate” for healthcare has been a socialist threat since the 1920s.  Samuel Gompers, an early American union leader, founder of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) and contemporary of Eugene Debbs, argued against the individual mandate as early as January 22, 1917:

“Compulsory social insurance is in its essence undemocratic and it cannot prevent or remove poverty.  The workers of America adhere to voluntary institutions in preference to compulsory systems, which are held to be not only impractical, but a menace to their rights, welfare, and their liberty.  Compulsory sickness insurance for workers is based on the theory that they are unable to look after their own interests and the state must use its authority and wisdom and assume the relation of parent and guardian.”

If Gompers could see the “individual mandate” coming in January of 1917, it is not so surprising that we now HAVE IT as enacted law today, in June 2011, despite considerable resistance in the courts and public mind.

And the general proposition that socialism would be imposed by stealth on the United States people without their realizing it has been around since at least 1947, when Harvard’s famed professor of history (and CUNY “Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities”) wrote in an oft-quoted essay:

IF SOCIALISM (i.e. OWNERSHIP BY THE STATE OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MEANS OF PRODUCTION) is to preserve democracy, it must be brought about step by step in a way which will not disrupt the fabric of custom, law, and mutual confidence upon which personal rights depend.

         That is, the transition must be piecemeal; it must be parliamentary; it must respect civil liberties and due process of law Socialism by such means used to seem fantastic to the hardeyed melodramatists of the Leninist persuasion; but even Stalin is reported to have told Harold Laski recently [remember this was written in 1947] that it might be possible.  . . . There seems no inherent obstacle to the gradual advance of socialism in the United States through a series of New Deals.  

        Socialism, then, appears quite practical within this frame of reference, as a longtime proposition.  Its graduate advance might well preserve law and order…. the active agents in effecting the transition will probably be, not the working classes, but some combination of lawyers, business and labor managers, politicians, and intellectuals, in the manner of the first New Deal.  

Quoted in John A. Stormer’s 1964 None Dare Call it Treason, Ch. XIII, Economics & Government: 199.

I submit to you that we find ourselves in a critical moment of history.  I oppose collectivism because I want to own my home and all its contents.  If people steal my home and all its contents under any pretext which violates my common law contractual and constitutional rights, I want them to be held liable as thieves and compelled either to restore my property to me or to compensate me very richly for the loss of the same.  I have in fact lost two homes and their valuable movable content to such “predatory lending practices”, once in Texas and once in California, both times in 2009.       I don’t think it is a coincidence that these criminal acts happened during the first full year of the first term of the first openly socialist President of the United States.  Expropriation and confiscation and destruction of private property are, in essence, a core part of the socialist way of life, mandated by the express terms of the Communist Manifesto of 1848.  

      How do you feel about your homes and property, if you still have them OR if you’ve already lost them?  Do you believe that those who oppose collectivism are routinely discredited by smears as I and so many others have been?  Do you believe that we should all accept that we “can’t fight city hall” as our philosophy and settle down to “exist” within the framework of a completely-controlled, federally dominated economy and culturally decimated way of life?  Do you feel that politicians should avoid genuine controversy, and focus on emotionally “hot” issues which are tangential to the choices we have to make that will define our own and our children’s way of life for hundreds of years to come?  

Should we all just look to our own individual interests or should we band together and fight until the laws which permit Collectivisation of our Society and the Confiscation and/or Expropriation of all that we own are repealed and or overturned?

NONE OF THESE THINGS WILL EVER OCCUR THROUGH INDIVIDUAL CASE-BY-CASE LITIGATION.  NONE OF US WILL EVER REALLY OWN PRIVATE PROPERTY AGAIN UNTIL ALL OF US CAN OWN PRIVATE PROPERTY and, within the words of the Fourth Amendment, know for sure that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” either by the Federal Government, the State Government, Local Sheriffs, or Privateering Real Estate Pirates Like Steven D. Silverstein and all the other marauders like him who operate “under color of law” in California and nationwide.

The Noose Tightens around Borrowers’ Necks in California: the time for Revolution against the Bank Controlled Government and Judiciary is NOW

JUDICIALLY UNQUESTIONABLE but PLAINLY ILLEGAL DEBT COLLECTION and ENFORCEMENT SPELLS DEATH to the AMERICAN FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, and the middle class’ (“bourgeois”) DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN STATE:

Ever since I learned of the Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loan decision on February 18, 2011 of this year, I have lost faith that the people can use any aspect of California law to shake off the “private property purges” whereby in true Stalinist fashion, the banks and the (apparently) Bank-Controlled Judiciary enforce mass foreclosure and eviction against the people.  Decision after decision comes down against homeowners, and all I can do is ask the downtrodden current and former homeowners and other victims of predatory lending in California (and everywhere in the United States) to support my campaign to become the next U.S. Senator from California and unseat the Banks’ and corrupt Judiciary’s best friend, Dianne Feinstein.

 I was “cite-checking” Gomes hopefully this morning, looking for some glimmer of light in the tunnel, and instead found this newly handed down, albeit unpublished, decision where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California had followed a whole series of bad, anti-private property, unconstitutional precedents, precisely last (but not at all least) among which was Gomes.  The Federal Courts seem unwilling to address the constitutionality of California Civil Code 2924 et seq., even the notorious subsections 2924a and 2924i which insulate trustees and trustee sales from all judicial challenges, and/or 1714.10 which shields lawyers from suit for every kind of fraud committed in conjunction with clients (and judges).  Despite the fact that ALL of these sections of the California Civil Code and related provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure violate the letter and spirt of the Constitution’s Impairment of Contracts clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the statutory guarantees of equal access to the Courts and equal rights to make and enforce contracts relating to the purchase and maintenance of interests in property enshrined in 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982 pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal Courts, the guarantors of the Constitution, unceasingly yield to the Bankers and Attorneys for the Mortgage Finance Industry:

2011 WL 1597475
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,

S.D. California.

Sharon J. MADRID, Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION doing business as BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, MERA, Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
No. 3:11–cv–0077 AJB (WVG).
April 26, 2011.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Mitchell L. Abdallah, Abdallah Law Group, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff.
Alison M. NorrisShanna M. RamsowerSteven A. Ellis, Goodwin Procter LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS MOOT
ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA, District Judge.
*1 Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 10), filed February 3, 2011, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 15), filed February 16, 2011.
BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2005, Plaintiff obtained a loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”) and executed a promissory note in the amount of $1,555,000. (Am.Compl.Ex. C). As security for the note, Plaintiff signed a Deed of Trust that was recorded on June 23, 2005. (Am.Compl.Ex. B). The Deed of Trust identifies Countrywide as the lender, ReconTrust Company, N.A. (“Recon”) as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary and nominee for the lender. (Id.). Bank of America Corporation doing business as BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP (“BAC”) purchased Countrywide. (Am.Compl.¶ 8).
Plaintiff subsequently defaulted on the loan. (Am.Compl.Ex. D). Recon, acting as an agent for MERS, issued a Notice of Default beginning foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff in September 2010. (Id.). Plaintiff received two letters from Recon, dated September 2, 2010, and September 23, 2010, verifying the indebtedness on the note and identifying Countrywide as the original creditor of the underlying debt. (Am.Compl.Ex. C).
On January 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action against BAC, MERS, and Does 1–50. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that MERS served solely as the nominee for the lender and could not be the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11). Plaintiff argues that MERS, while serving a limited capacity as nominee on the Deed of Trust, had no authority to transfer any beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 11, 12). Plaintiff contends that the current beneficiary of the note is unknown because there are “no recorded documents that transfer, convey, or assign any rights, title or interest as beneficiary holding legal title to a different present beneficiary.” (Id. at ¶ 9). Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Recon lacks the authority necessary to institute foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiff’s property. Based on these allegations, the First Amended Complaint contains the following five counts: Count One—Fraud and Fraud in the Inducement against BAC and MERS; Count Two—Declaratory Relief against BAC; Count Three—Negligence against BAC and MERS; Count Four—Negligent Misrepresentation against BAC and MERS; and Count Five—Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 against BAC.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir.2001). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6)dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
*2 However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the … laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 557).
For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally cannot consider material outside the complaint. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453–54 (9th Cir.1994)overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2002). A court may, however, consider exhibits submitted with the complaint. Van Winkle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1162 n. 2 (C.D.Cal.2003). A court may disregard allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.1987).
ANALYSIS
California Civil Code section 2924 provides the “comprehensive statutory framework established to govern nonjudicial foreclosure sales [and] is intended to be exhaustive.” Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 834, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1994)I.E. Assoc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. ., 39 Cal.3d 281, 216 Cal.Rptr. 438, 702 P.2d 596 (1985). Under section 2924(a)(1), a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents” may conduct the foreclosure process. The Deed of Trust names Recon as the trustee and MERS as nominee for the lender and beneficiary. (Am. Compl. Ex. C at 2). While the Amended Complaint argues that MERS does not have the capacity to act as a beneficiary, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any legal basis for this proposition. In fact, Plaintiff agreed to MERS’ designation as nominee and beneficiary with the power to foreclose when she executed the Deed of Trust. That document clearly states that “Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property….” (Id. at 3–4, 216 Cal.Rptr. 438, 702 P.2d 596.). Thus, pursuant to the Deed of Trust, MERS had authority to assign its interest beneficial interest to another party. Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1198 (E.D.Cal.2009)Lane, 713 F.Supp.2d at 1099 (“MERS has standing to foreclose as the nominee for the lender and beneficiary of the Deed of Trust and may assign its beneficial interest to another party”). As discussed further below, Plaintiff’s claims to the contrary are unsupported.
*3 Count One alleges that BAC and MERS engaged in fraud by intentionally omitting the fact that “MERS had no authority to convey or transfer its beneficial interest to any party because it lacked the substantive rights and … had no legal beneficial interest to begin with.” (Am.Compl.¶ 30). Plaintiff claims that “[t]hrough MERS’s invalid transfer of the Deed of Trust to BAC, a scheme was borne [sic] wherein BAC, as the purported/beneficiary of the Note is now attempting to collect the debt and foreclose on the Subject Property as though it has legal authority to do so.” (Id. at ¶ 28). As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s allegations that BAC is foreclosing on the loan contradict the Notice of Default attached to the Amended Complaint. (Am.Compl.Ex. D). The Notice of Default clearly states that Recon acting as an agent for MERS is foreclosing on Plaintiff’s property. Both Recon as the trustee and MERS as the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust have authority to foreclose following Plaintiff’s default by virtue of section 2924(a)(1). Additionally, Plaintiff has not pled her fraud claim with particularity as required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). While Plaintiff argues that Defendants fraudulently failed to inform her of MERS’ capabilities, Plaintiff has not offered any support for her claim that MERS could not legally serve as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust or the specific nature of the alleged omissions by the Defendants. For these reasons, Count One is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Counts Three and Four are based upon allegations nearly identical to those in Count One and, thus, fail for the same reason. Count Three asserts a negligence claim against BAC and MERS. Plaintiff claims the Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by acting carelessly when filing, transferring, and assigning loan-related documents without regard to whether the documents reflected the truth and by wrongfully instituting the foreclosure sale.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 46, 47, 50). Similarly, Count Four alleges that BAC and MERS made negligent misrepresentations and omissions “causing Plaintiff to believe any transfers, sales or assignments of the Note would be made in a legal manner consistent with prevailing state law.” (Id. at ¶ 55). Counts Three and Four allege, in essence, that BAC and MERS negligently failed to inform Plaintiff that MERS could not legally serve as beneficiary on the Deed of Trust or make valid transfers of its interest under the Deed of Trust. Once again, Plaintiff has not offered any support for her claim that MERS could not legally serve as beneficiary. Pursuant to the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff authorized MERS to serve as nominee for the lender and as the beneficiary. Thus, Counts Three and Four are dismissed.
Count Two requests declaratory relief because the “scheduled foreclosure and sale [of Plaintiff's property] will be wrongful and should be enjoined by virtue of the facts alleged” in the Amended Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 44). Plaintiff specifies in her prayer for relief that she seeks a declaration that “trustee had no right to foreclose and conduct the trustee sale, and has no right to transfer title as a result of that sale because no breach occurred by Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. Prayer ¶ 1). As discussed above, a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents” may conduct the foreclosure process. Inasmuch as Recon had authority to foreclose as both either the trustee or as the beneficiary’s agent under section 2924(a)(1), Count Two is dismissed.
*4 Count Five alleges that BAC violated the FDCPA “in that it should have informed Plaintiff that it was the legal owner or had authority from the legal owner to collect and pursue payment on the debt tied to the Note secured to the Deed of Trust.” (Id. at ¶ 60). The FDCPA prohibits certain unfair and oppressive methods of collecting debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. In order to be liable under the FDCPA, BAC must fall under its definition of “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A “debt collector” under the FDCPA is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” Id. However, it was Recon “acting as an agent for the Beneficiary” MERS that filed the Notice of Default under the Deed of Trust.2 (Am. Compl. Ex. D at 2). Nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests that BAC had any communication with Plaintiff in an attempt to collect on the mortgage debt. Accordingly, Count Five is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As Plaintiff may wish to amend her Complaint, the Court also notes that Count Five fails to identify the specific sections of the FDCPA that BAC allegedly violated. It is not the role of the Court to construct Plaintiff’s claims based upon the general nature of her pleadings. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Count Five needs to provided more direction as to the nature of Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.
Having dismissed each of Plaintiff’s claims for the reasons set forth above, the Court need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments in favor of dismissal, though Plaintiff may wish to consider them when contemplating an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint consistent with this Order within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, no additional parties or causes of action shall be included without first filing a motion for leave to amend.
Inasmuch as the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as moot.

Footnotes

It should be noted that Plaintiff provided no authority for the proposition that BAC or MERS owed a duty to Plaintiff in their capacities as lender, beneficiary, or servicer of the loan. Generally, absent special circumstances a loan transaction is at arms-length and no duties arise from the loan transaction outside of those in the agreement.Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1198 (E.D.Cal.2009)Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.4th 453, 466, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 (2006).
Plaintiff expresses concern throughout her Amended Complaint that “it is unclear how [Recon] has been given authority to collect payments, or foreclose on the Subject Property” and that Recon failed to provide any “evidence or clarification as to who the current beneficiary/real party in interest is.” (Am.Compl.¶¶ 25, 21). However, the Notice of Default clearly provides that Recon was acting on behalf of MERS. Section 2924 authorizes Recon to initiate foreclosure proceedings while serving in its capacity as either the named trustee or as agent for the named beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. Cal. Civ.Code § 2924(a)(1). As to the Plaintiff’s suggestion that Recon had some sort of obligation to disclose the current beneficiary of the loan, Plaintiff has provided no authority to support this proposition and the Deed of Trust contains “no suggestion that the lender or its successors and assigns must provide [Plaintiff] with assurances that MERS is authorized to proceed with a foreclosure at the time it is initiated .”See Gomes, 192 Cal.App.4th at 1157, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819.