POSITION OPEN TO ANY LAWYER INTERESTED IN OR WILLING TO CHALLENGE THE ESTABLISHMENT ON A “HOT BUTTON” RACE ISSUE!
RENADA NADINE MARCH, JOSEPH & ANA COHEN, & AURORA I. DIAZ, SPONSORED BY THE CHARLES LINCOLN FOR TIERRA LIMPIA TRUST and DEO VINDICE FOUNDATION, SEEK CONSTITUTIONAL ATTORNEY TO CHALLENGE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY U.S. JUDICIARY IN APPLICATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS.
Specifically, we need a Constitutional Lawyer with experience and/or interest in state-federal jurisdictional comity to represent defendants (possible class action) who filed civil rights removal to federal court; we specifically need immediate representation on the question of the Court’s judicially fashioned racially discriminatory scheme in application and enforcement of civil rights laws (“all race based schemes should be subject to strict scrutiny, even those called” benign which were instituted by the U.S. Supreme Court).
A hearing is set for July 19, 2010, but new and qualified counsel could probably get a continuance. However, the arguments are really extremely simple: Judge David O. Carter has ordered Defendant Renada Nadine March to explain why her removal of a forcible detainer case from California Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Central District of California should not be remanded for failure to comply with a judicially mandated program of racial discrimination in the application of certain federal statutes, to wit 28 U.S.C. Sections 1443 and 1447, which are facially colorblind and contain broad, racially neutral language regarding their intended purpose and application. The express purpose is to ensure that defendants who are condemned by an express statement of state law to lose, so that all cases are fixed, whether facially or as applied, can remove the prosecutions against them to the U.S. District Court to raise defenses which are unavailable to them, as a practical matter of law or local customs and policies having the force of law, in state Court. It is beyond reasonable doubt that California Superior Courts presiding over forcible eviction/unlawful detainer prosecutions following non-judicial foreclosures are such “one way streets” in which each and every Defendant’s federally secured rights are designed to be denied by the mere fact of bringing the Defendant to trial in state court—swiftly and efficiently. Defendants Joseph & Ana Cohen and Aurora I. Diaz are directly interested in the outcome of this issue because they have removed their own forcible eviction/unlawful detainer cases from California Superior Court to U.S. District Court.
We are now seeking an attorney who is either well-versed in, passionately interested in, or at the very least willing to become well-versed in and passionately interested in the question whether “strict scrutiny” should apply to a judicially shaped policy which turns a statute which is colorblind and racially neutral on its face into an instrument of so-called “benign” (i.e. pro minority, mostly pro-African American) Discrimination by denying equal access to removal for serious violations of civil rights which are not explicitly racial in nature or context.
Simply summarized, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 is directly violated by the California Legislative-Judicial two step program of non-judicial foreclosure followed by judicial evictions devoid of due process or any normal or realistic possibility for ordinary defendants to win. California non-judicial foreclosure is effectively insulated from most common law contract-based challenges under under California Civil Code 2924 et seq. both on its face as enacted by the California Legislature and as applied by the Superior Courts of the State of California.
California non-judicial foreclosure is followed by California Superior Court judicial evictions which are carefully designed and expressly limited to obliterate all the rights secured by 42 U.S.C. Section 1981(a): “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” and 1981(b) “For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” The total effect and combined result of this language is or ought to be that the common law of contract and property is insulated from legislative or judicial impairment: 1981(c) “The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” That contractual rights are related to property rights is obvious from 1981, but confirmed by 1982, which enforces equality “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”
Freedom of Contract and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to the security of property from invasion or seizure by the government or private properties acting under governmental authority or delegation depended in the Reconstruction era on state adherence to the common law, and in essence, they still do.
We also take the position that the references to “white citizens” in 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982 is as archaic and out of place, and as subject to analysis under strict scrutiny requiring excision from the U.S. Code like any other irrational and racially discriminatory provisions of any law which does not serve a legitimate and compelling governmental objective.
Our position is that there should be no racial discrimination in the application of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1443 and 1447, and that this legal argument is so plain and simple that any attorney licensed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California should be capable of presenting this case. The main difficulty is a willingness to challenge the race-based scheme mandated by plain Supreme Court precedent (from 1966-1975) which is directly contrary to and contradictory of the Bakke through Bollinger jurisprudence on equal protection from 1978-2003 and which is “good law” at the present time.
The mortgage foreclosure and eviction crisis currently sweeping the United States in general, and California in particular, goes to the heart of a basic question: are common law concepts such as privity of contract, holder in due course standing, and legal capacity or formation as an entity, so essential to constitutional definitions of private property and freedom of contract that any state statute which abrogates or infringes upon these rights, for example, by creating by statute (such as exists in California) a two step non-judicial foreclosure procedure followed by a predetermined one-way judicial eviction policy, may be said to be a statute unconstitutionally impairing the obligations of contract?
Note from Charles Lincoln: Founder of Tierra Limpia Trust and Deo Vindice Foundation. As any regular reader of this blog knows, in addition to holding a Master’s and Doctoral degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, wherein I wrote a dissertation entitled, “Ethnicity and Social Organization,” I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School who does not currently possess a valid license to appear on behalf of others in the state courts of California, Florida, or Texas where I was once licensed. There are those both on-line and in the State Bar Organizations who think that the historical context of my disbarment is unimportant, and that one need only look at the formal charges against me to determine that I should not be taken seriously. Naturally, I disagree and submit that historical context is everything: I was disbarred as a result of charges and an indictment handed down for one purpose and one purpose only: to silence me and to prevent the effective prosecution of my civil rights cases on behalf of non-minority victims of police brutality and systematic policies of violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Constitutional Rights in Texas. In short, all of the events leading to my indictment and disbarment were the direct result of my having stood up for the principle that Civil Rights Law is for everybody, including the white majority, and not just for minorities. I think that the “powers that be” in Texas in the 1990s who later took national office in the elections of 2000 and all their supporters at every level are deeply threatened, indeed offended, by the idea that all Americans should have civil rights. As long as Civil Rights are only available to minorities, the concept of “discrimination” can be used to create divisions among the people and to enhance the power of transcendent government and its corporate conglomerate allies. A nation in which civil rights applied to everyone would, from the standpoint of our national government, and most of its partisans and political officers, seem simply ungovernable. It is my position that “none can be free until all are free” and that a civil rights policy which enhances the rights of any minority while denying the same rights and access to the courts to the majority is unworthy of the name of American Constitutional government.
Please Call Renada Nadine March at 949-586-4020 or 949-276-1970 (email@example.com) or Kathleen Waller (727) 277-9352; firstname.lastname@example.org; if you are an attorney interested in representing Renada Nadine March, and possibly Joseph & Ana Cohen and Aurora I. Diaz as well.