No Lawyer Came Forward, so Renada is Buffy—“One Girl in all the World” against the Forces of Darkness (or, at least in Orange County)

I suppose that Renada is now that “one girl in all the world”, like Buffy Ann Summers fighting the Forces of Darkness in Orange County; so that would make me her “watcher” Rupert Giles.  Like Buffy & Giles, our activities are subversive to the “powers that be” and exist outside of the normal realm of law or procedure, because the “powers that be” simply do not recognize the existence of Vampires like Larry Rothman and Steven D. Silverstein.
FAY E. MARCH07-19-2010_RNM_FEM_Supplemental Opposition to Remand 10-cv-00516


7 Bluebird Lane

Aliso Viejo, California 92656

Tel: 949-276-1970






PLAINTIFF,                                                  8:10-cv-00516-DOC-E




And FAY E. MARCH (Intervener)



To the Honorable United States District Judge, DAVID O. CARTER:

Comes now Defendants Renada Nadine March and her elderly mother Fay E. March with recently discovered facts circumstances and documentary evidence in support of Debtor’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s  Motion  to Remand To State Court .

1)   Defendants Renada Nadine March and Fay E. March Oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to remand to State Court on the basis of new facts and evidence and points of law as set forth below. 

2)   Defendants removed to Federal Court for one reason and one reason only:

[IN ALL UNLAWFUL DETAINER/FORCIBLE EVICTION CASES BROUGHT IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOLLOWING A NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE]: “it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 800, 828, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d 1957 (1966)(citing Georgia v. Rachel; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303.”

3)   This Court, in its Minute Order (Document 16) Rendered on June 4, 2010, has authorized supplemental briefing: “the Court will hear legal argument as to why the civil rights removal statute should not be construed as requiring the violation of rights in terms of racial equity.”

4)   The civil rights removal statute should not be construed as requiring the violation of rights in terms of racially equality because, FIRST, such a requirement of what can only be called “racial discrimination” does not exist within the text of the statute.

5)   The United States Supreme Court has developed a race-based scheme for the enforcement of 28 U.S.C. §§1443 & 1447(d) which is consistent with the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. §1981, 1982, but NOT with the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. §§1443 & 1447(d).

6)   Justice O’Connor, in Richmond v. Croson, in 1989, wrote that strict scrutiny must apply to all race-based schemes, even those called “benign”.

7)   Application of “strict scrutiny” to any governmental law, program, statute, or policy means that, in order to sustain the questioned law, program, statute, or policy, the Court must find by a preponderance of the credible evidence that after careful consideration of alternatives, the law, program, statute, or policy is the least restrictive means, the most narrowly tailored discriminatory infringement upon fundamental right to “equal protection under the law”, to achieve a COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVE (Compelling objective = legitimate + lots of other positive value judgments concerning the policy, program, or statutory scheme).

8)   In sum, the law after Croson (confirmed by Adarand v. Pena as covering federal as well as state programs, laws, and policies) is this: all race-based schemes must be subjected to strict scrutiny, such that unless the Court can find a compelling objective and a tight means-end fit, this Court must strike down the offending law, program, statute, or policy as an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment.

9)   Defendants submit that, given the absolutely racially neutral, totally colorblind language of 28 U.S.C. §§1443 & 1447(d), there is no possibility that a system of race-based discrimination in the application of this statute serves any compelling governmental purpose.

10)                  Obviously, the Court’s race-based scheme is “benign” in the sense that it is not oppressive to racial minorities, but it is completely irrational and discriminatory against the majority, and does not match the broad inclusive language of 28 U.S.C. §1443(1), but this does not mean that the scheme serves any compelling governmental purpose or is legitimate.

11)                  Much less can this judicial custom, practice, or policy in the racially discriminatory application of Civil Rights Removal be deemed the “least restrictive” or “most narrowly tailored” means to achieving any legitimate governmental purpose.

12)                  If the purpose of the racially discriminatory enforcement of the

13)                  The Civil Rights Crisis of the 1950s-1960s was not greater than the mortgage crisist facing America today.  As a matter of fact, the American Crisis today is MUCH WORSE—and does indeed cross all racial, sexual, and class boundaries: the mortgage crisis goes to the very heart of the rights to enjoy life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

14)                  The question this Court must resolve is whether a judicially crafted construction or policy of statutory interpretation, formulated in the years 1966-1975 prior to the decision and reformulation of the Court’s “strict scrutiny” doctrine relating to equal protection as articulated in the line of cases running from Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 1978, to Richmond v. Croson, 1989, Adarand v. Pena, 1995, and Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, must equally be struck down as “reverse discrimination.”

15)                  If Judges don’t follow the law then who will?

16)                  If the Judiciary cannot apply to its own older doctrines those which are newer, if Judicial decisions such as Greenwood v. Peacock, Rachel v. Georgia, and Johnson v. Mississippi are held to be immune from strict scrutiny analysis, then there is truly no integrity to the Common Constitutional law of the land, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, whatsoever.

17)                  This Court stated on June 4, 2010, that the inquiry whether race-based criteria should apply to Civil Rights Removal was not fact-intensive.  Defendants March & March agree: strict scrutiny requires that the judicial construction or policy of race-based Civil Rights Removal last articulated by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Mississippi (1975) can and must be struck down, plainly and simply, as a matter of law.

18)                  But Civil Rights Removal itself, as described by the non-racial elements of removal analyzed in Greenwood v. Peacock and Johnson v. Mississippi, are legitimate and must be analyzed in relationship to the facts and statistics about the conduct of Unlawful Detainer/Forcible Eviction cases in Orange County, and California generally?

19)                  Does the state statutory scheme, taken as a whole, allow for any defenses once the charge of Unlawful Detainer is brought?  In essence, this is one of those “rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state ” that the answer is NO, Defendants in California Superior Court do not have any readily available statutory defenses once the charge of Unlawful Detainer/plea for Forcible Eviction is brought: they cannot EVEN challenge the standing of a Plaintiff to bring the suit.

20)                  As Silverstein & Rothman repeatedly have reiterated: so long as the Plaintiff has made all the proper allegations, California Superior Courts will not allow any trial of the facts properly alleged—the mere proper (or even the nearly proper) ALLEGATION of standing to evict following a non-judicial foreclosure inevitably leads to eviction, the Defendant “does not have a Chinaman’s chance”, to use an archaic racially charged-metaphor.

21)                  This terrible metaphor reflected, and definitely indicated the existence of a custom, practice, or policy of malignant, non-benign, discrimination which had its origins in the early United States legal history of the State of California.  The phrase dates to the period when Chinese laborers were brought in to the West in the late 1860s and 1870s, after the Abolition of Black Chattel Slavery in the South, when the Chinese “coolies” were treated without respect and without rights, when they had no access to the Courts, or to any form of Justice, when persons or Oriental origin were, quite frankly, uniformly treated like defendants in Unlawful Detainer/Forcible Eviction cases in California in 2010.

22)                  The court must consider the constitutional nature of the defendants claims to right of to Due Process of law and their right to a fair and impartial hearing are better suited to Federal Court, than State of California superior Court where ownership and title issues are considered as a moot point and Homeowners are customarily and BY Statutory LAW, classified and treated as ordinary renters,  contractually defaulting tenants who have failed to pay rent.

23)                  Additionally the Court should take under consideration that the Defendants in this case are not representing themselves In Pro Per not by choice!   But rather in desperation, due to lack of the financial wherewithal to retain counsel to protect their constitutional rights to their home and principal dwelling place and consideration of their claims of being unlawfully stripped of their home equity and also consider that the defendant  may be victims of an unlawful conveyance of their title who have  been wrongfully and intentionally taken advantage of by the plaintiffs and their commercial lending business partners and their professional corporate attorneys.

24)                  The characteristic of a defrauded and economically disadvantaged State of California Homeowner, is one that the Court must conclude represents ; like gender, race, and religion a constitutionally suspect basis upon which to impose judicially differential and biased treatment.

25)                  Defendants submit the question is not WHETHER Due Process of law will be denied, in their exact circumstances, circumstances, as a direct and proximate result of a pervasive state statutory scheme, but rather, Defendants contend that the FACTS WILL SHOW that ion all cases a meaningful hearing WILL BE denied, not in some but in 99.99% of the cases.

26)                  It is no solution to say that a writ of scire facias or other hopelessly obscure non-statutory defenses may be available.

27)                  For most defendants, who will appear in Pro Per, their situation is this: they are victims of predatory mortgage lending fraud and have, by the actions of their “creditors” been deprived of any and all the financial wherewithal to retain the services of an attorney.

28)                  The court should also take into consideration that a great number of the defendants in Unlawful Detainer/Forcible Eviction cases, ALSO sustained  harm  as a result of plaintiff’s direct misrepresentations and  wrongful acts of deceptive lending practiced by unscrupulous sub-prime commercial lenders and their banking/investment partners who now wrongfully claim the right of possession to these defendants home and principal dwelling place.

29)                  In its order of  July 6, 2010, the Court expressed sympathy for Plaintiff’s Counsel for having “been required to appear in this Court five times for hearings on this matter” (July 6, 2010, Document 26).

30)                  How much greater is the onus on the present Defendants, Renada Nadine and Fay E. March who, unlike Plaintiff’s counsel are not otherwise employed or paid to appear in Court, but who are threatened with homelessness following an illegal foreclosure by way of a judicial process in California Superior Court which will not hear their defenses, not even allow a trial on the question of ownership or standing, because California statutory schemes, although “non-racial” create IRREBUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS, even more ironclad than the aforementioned “lack of a Chinaman’s chance” and worse and more certain than that African-American males in the South would be lynched on charges of having sex with a white woman.

31)                  Where is the Clarence Darrow or Atticus Finch needed to defend California defendants here and now?

32)                  Defendants Renada and Fay March suffered severe personal injuries and have been undergoing continual sedation by pain-killers since their one and only car was totaled on July 5, 2010.  They have been forced to seek medical attention and have been unable to seek legal counsel.

33)                  Plaintiff Fay E. March, a senior citizen in her ninth decade of life, was so badly injured in this crash that she developed fluid in and around her lungs and this condition required special testing and attention, in addition to the fact that both of these single women have been living with constant pain and the disorientation of post-traumatic shock for all of the past two weeks.

34)                  These Defendants are simply lacking in full mental or physical capacity to defend themselves at the present time, and they ask this Court to use its broad discretion to appoint counsel for them.  Counsel would be appointed for even the most minor criminal charge, and yet Forcible Eviction/Unlawful Detainer cannot be commuted to “probation” or “deferred adjudication.”

35)                  Defendants pray for justice and equity, and for a hearing to give their evidence.

36)                  The Court should consider that the In Pro Per  defendants in spite of having tired every avenue and having  done their due diligence have been financially unable to secure the services of an attorney to help the defendants avail themselves of their rightful legal remedies of due process of law, as guaranteed by the American Constitution, to defend themselves against suspected crimes of title fraud and mortgage lending abuse as evidenced below, that may have been committed by an unscrupulous corporate investor, for the purpose of stealing the defendants rightful equity.

37)                  The court is under a duty to examine the Pro Se pleading to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975), quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1971).

38)                  On or about Friday July 16, as supported by the Declaration of Defendant Fay E. March filed herewith in support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion  to Remand To State Court, Defendants  Renada Nadine March and Fay E. March  the Defendants  in this action were provided with a Preliminary Report and Declaration of forensic investigator and document analyst  Charles J. Koppa indicating that certain documents have been recently discovered indicating that the subject property title was not duly perfected by the prior beneficiary and  therefore leading the Defendants to  discover and believe  that the purported October 9th, 2009 Trust Deed Sale  of the subject property by beneficiary may be subject to judicial scrutiny as unqualified and due to suspected  fraudulent activity by the prior beneficiary may be determined to be VOID .

39)                  On or about Friday July 16, As supported by the Declaration of Defendant  Fay E. March  filed herewith  in support of Defendant’s  Opposition to Plaintiff’s  Motion  to Remand To State Court, Defendants  Ranada Nadine March and Fay E. March  were provided with an initial  results of a  indicating that Defendants  Ranada Nadine March and Fay E. March   may be victims of  criminal mortgage lending fraud,  as a result of  an on-going  research by  investigator  Catherine Bryan Ibarra  of  Kokopelli Community Workshop  Fraud Research Project (hereinafter in this document referred to as, KCWFR)  who  actively liaisons with   homeowners who are suspected of being  victims of mortgage lending fraud for the purpose of reporting their findings to the  National FBI Financial Institution Fraud Unit, The Federal Trade Commission, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. KCWFR  has investigated,  uncovered  and reported  more than 1,000  incidences of Mortgage Lending Fraud against multiple commercial lenders and investors,  ranging from  irregularly reported and recoded documents  to violations  of  commercial lending law and  in other cases mortgage servicing fraud violations, commercial financial elder abuse, unwarranted foreclosures and common violations of Trust Deed Sale Laws and Procedures.

40)                  Defendants Renada and Fay March respectfully request that the Court take under judicial consideration of the declarations filed herewith, see Exhibit A by Forensic Foreclosure Auditor and Expert Investigator, Charles J. Koppa, and Defendants Renada and Fay March see Exhibit B, and deny plaintiffs Motion for Remand to State court for 90 days until professional mortgage fraud investigators can complete their investigation and provide testimony to this Court.

41)                  Defendants ask that this Court accept a further Supplement to this case AFTER July 19, 2010, to more fully address and analyze the questions presented by Bankruptcy Removal under 28 U.S.C. §§1334 and 1452, although the same basic issues of fairness and equity do apply: in that the State Courts will neither hear nor allow challenges to the legitimacy or standing of evictions or non-judicial foreclosures.

WHEREFORE, PURSUANT TO THE ABOVE FACTS AND EVIDENCE Defendants Fay E. March and Renada Nadine March pray that this Court, grant an order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to State Court .

Respectfully submitted,

July 19, 2010


RENADA NADINE MARCH, Pro se/in propia persona

7 Bluebird Lane

Aliso Viejo, California 92656

Telephone: 949-276-1970


And by:___________________________________

FAY E. MARCH, Pro se/in propia persona

7 Bluebird Lane

Aliso Viejo, California 92656

Telephone: 949-276-1970


I the undersigned Defendant do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of this SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE UNDER FEDERAL CODES OF EVIDENCE 901, 902, 1002, and 803.6, IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT. upon Plaintiff’s Counsel by way of  E-Mail on July 19th, 2010, approximately ______ pm  at:, and delivered to Larry Rothman attorney for Steven D. Silverstein, and to Steven D. Silverstein individually, to:


Larry Rothman & Associates

(Counsel for Steven D. Silverstein)

City Plaza—1 City Boulevard West, Suite 850

Orange, California 92868


Facsimile: (714) 363-0229

And to

Steven D. Silverstein, Attorney-at-Law

(as counsel for Meglodon Financial, LLC)

Silverstein Eviction Law

14351 Redhill Ave., Suite #G

Tustin, CA 92780

FACSIMILE: 714-832-7781

Served by the Defendant and Respectfully Submitted to the Court,

Monday, July 19th, 2010



Removing pro se/in pro per

7 Bluebird Lane

Aliso Viejo, California 92656

Telephone: 949-276-1970



Declaration of Charles J. Koppa


Declaration of Fay E. March

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