I think I will wait to sue Orly again until after the Election……and even then I’ll probably sue in Florida….


The 2012 Election is going to be very important.  It is important to put Obama’s socialism on trial. Rumor has it that Dr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S., Esq., will be running for Senate against Dianne Feinstein in 2012.  Orly Taitz is not a genuine conservative: she believes in the Police State. Orly’s crusade against Obama was a mere distraction, at best, and a total fraud at worst: she supports “real ID” for Political Candidates and her contribution to Civil Rights is to use Obama’s lies and crimes as further reasons for the suppression of all important constitutional liberties.  The way I see it now, Orly may have even launched her crusade solely for the purpose of discrediting the Constitutional Eligibility movement and IF that was her purpose, MAN O MAN did she ever succeed.  There are few worse things anyone can call any serious politician these days than a “Birther.” If Philip J. Berg had stayed in charge of the movement, it would have remained serious.  With Orly, it became the worst of bad jokes.  But even beyond her status as “Queen of the Birthers”, Orly is no conservative: Orly and her husband love corporate welfare, big government, wasteful government spending, and all aspects of the phony-money credit-based economy.  Orly loves the Federal Reserve and all its evils (whether she would admit it in public or not).  Orly Taitz is, in short, about as likely to promote actual positive change as….Rick Perry (P = O.00%).  

Rumor has it that Charles Edward Lincoln, III, will also be running for Senate against Dianne Feinstein in 2012.  If both of these rumors turn out to be true, there will be a lot of really bad jokes in atrociously poor taste and snide comments bordering on the obscene circulating all around, so we may as well start preparing to deal with them.  It is well known that Charles Edward Lincoln filed suit against Orly and her puppet-master “husband” Yosef in October 2010, only to abandon this suit at the end of March 2011, when Judge Andrew Guilford refused to allow Philip J. Berg to represent Lincoln.  Judge Guilford’s bizarre reasoning in so refusing, and his general unfairness in applying these reasons are made all the more mysterious and opaque by the fact that Berg has been litigating against Orly Taitz in front of Judge Andrew Guilford ever since his case against Orly was transferred to California at the end of March, almost exactly contemporaneously with my request for dismissal without prejudice, which I got. Berg has been representing himself, Lisa Liberi, and Lisa Ostella, in what can only be called a “battle royal” against Orly, Yosef and half of the major legal investigative & research companies in the United States (8:11-cv-00485-AG, Liberi v. Taitz, United States District Court, Central District of California, Southern Division, Santa Ana).  Phil Berg seems to be doing pretty well, having made it past the “12(b)(6) barrier” against several major corporate defendants.  Orly and Yosef continue to play squirrelly games, but I predict ultimate victory for Berg & company.  

At the present time, I do not have the energy both to pursue the case against Orly and all of her minions AND run for Senate AND continue more important and interesting cases of constitutional importance.  So I started thinking: am I really bound by California statutes of limitations and other law in this case?  And I think the answer is, no, I am not.  I was actually working in Florida when contacted by Orly in late May 2009.  My primary client throughout 2009 was Dr. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson of Palm Beach Gardens, who was, not at all coincidentally, the person who introduced me to Orly and suggested I work with her in the first place.  Orly’s primary litigation fiascos in 2009 were in Florida (and Georgia), including but not limited to Rivernider v. U.S. Bank where she was to represent me and some of my trust beneficiaries.  And it was in this case where she instituted malicious prosecution against me (or attempted to do so).  So Florida is a perfectly good venue and choice of law state for renewing my litigation against Orly.  And I will wait to do it until later because the Florida Statutes of Limitation are SOO much more generous with regard to every element of any and every cause of action I might bring than California, to wit:

THE FLORIDA STATUTESTitle VIII
LIMITATIONS


95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.—Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:

(1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS.—An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state.
(2) WITHIN FIVE YEARS.—

(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country.
(b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, except for an action to enforce a claim against a payment bond, which shall be governed by the applicable provisions of ss. 255.05(10) and 713.23(1)(e).
(c) An action to foreclose a mortgage.
(d) An action alleging a willful violation of s. 448.110.
(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), an action for breach of a property insurance contract, with the period running from the date of loss.
(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.—

(a) An action founded on negligence.
(b) An action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.
(c) An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.
(d) An action to recover public money or property held by a public officer or employee, or former public officer or employee, and obtained during, or as a result of, his or her public office or employment.
(e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures.
(f) An action founded on a statutory liability.
(g) An action for trespass on real property.
(h) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property.
(i) An action to recover specific personal property.
(j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud.
(k) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.
(l) An action to rescind a contract.
(m) An action for money paid to any governmental authority by mistake or inadvertence.
(n) An action for a statutory penalty or forfeiture.
(o) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort, except as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).
(p) Any action not specifically provided for in these statutes.
(q) An action alleging a violation, other than a willful violation, of s. 448.110.
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—

(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued, except that this 4-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child’s eighth birthday. An “action for medical malpractice” is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. The limitation of actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care. In those actions covered by this paragraph in which it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury the period of limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred, except that this 7-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child’s eighth birthday. This paragraph shall not apply to actions for which ss. 766.301766.316 provide the exclusive remedy.
(c) An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.
(d) An action for wrongful death.
(e) An action founded upon a violation of any provision of chapter 517, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.
(f) An action for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving either as a civilian or as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States during the period January 1, 1962, through May 7, 1975; the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
(g) An action for libel or slander.
(5) WITHIN ONE YEAR.—

(a) An action for specific performance of a contract.
(b) An action to enforce an equitable lien arising from the furnishing of labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property.
(c) An action to enforce rights under the Uniform Commercial Code—Letters of Credit, chapter 675.
(d) An action against any guaranty association and its insured, with the period running from the date of the deadline for filing claims in the order of liquidation.
(e) An action to enforce any claim against a payment bond on which the principal is a contractor, subcontractor, or sub-subcontractor as defined in s. 713.01, for private work as well as public work, from the last furnishing of labor, services, or materials or from the last furnishing of labor, services, or materials by the contractor if the contractor is the principal on a bond on the same construction project, whichever is later.
(f) Except for actions described in subsection (8), a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner as defined in s. 57.085.
(g) Except for actions described in subsection (8), an action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement.
(6) LACHES.—Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or prejudiced by the delay. This subsection shall not affect application of laches at an earlier time in accordance with law.
(7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.—An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.
(8) WITHIN 30 DAYS FOR ACTIONS CHALLENGING CORRECTIONAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.—Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.
(9) SEXUAL BATTERY OFFENSES ON VICTIMS UNDER AGE 16.—An action related to an act constituting a violation of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such action other than one which would have been time barred on or before July 1, 2010.
(10) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS RESULTING IN DEATH FROM ACTS DESCRIBED IN S. 782.04 OR S. 782.07.—Notwithstanding paragraph (4)(d), an action for wrongful death seeking damages authorized under s. 768.21 brought against a natural person for an intentional tort resulting in death from acts described in s. 782.04 or s. 782.07 may be commenced at any time. This subsection shall not be construed to require an arrest, the filing of formal criminal charges, or a conviction for a violation of s. 782.04 or s. 782.07 as a condition for filing a civil action.
History.—s. 10, ch. 1869, 1872; s. 1, ch. 3900, 1889; RS 1294; GS 1725; s. 10, ch. 7838, 1919; RGS 2939; CGL 4663; s. 1, ch. 21892, 1943; s. 7, ch. 24337, 1947; s. 24, ch. 57-1; s. 1, ch. 59-188; s. 1, ch. 67-284; s. 1, ch. 71-254; s. 30, ch. 73-333; s. 7, ch. 74-382; s. 7, ch. 75-9; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 11, ch. 78-435; s. 1, ch. 80-322; s. 34, ch. 83-38; s. 1, ch. 84-13; s. 1, ch. 85-63; s. 139, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 86-231; s. 1, ch. 86-272; s. 1, ch. 88-397; s. 20, ch. 90-109; s. 1, ch. 92-102; s. 520, ch. 95-147; s. 2, ch. 95-283; s. 4, ch. 96-106; s. 1, ch. 96-167; s. 15, ch. 98-280; s. 2, ch. 99-5; s. 12, ch. 99-137; s. 2, ch. 2001-211; s. 15, ch. 2005-230; s. 1, ch. 2005-353; s. 1, ch. 2006-145; s. 2, ch. 2010-45; s. 1, ch. 2010-54; s. 1, ch. 2011-39.
Copyright © 1995-2011 The Florida Legislature

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