Tag Archives: Bank of America

Bank of America Slammed For Pursuing Nonexistent Debt and Filing False Foreclosure: Judgment for Borrower $204,000

Goodin v Bank of America N.A.

(with many thanks to J. Larry Nemec who forwarded this to me).

A Jacksonville federal judge has issued a sharp critique of Bank of America in a case involving a Jacksonville couple where the bank mishandled court filings and began a years-long process of trying to collect a non-existent debt and falsely filing for foreclosure.

Bank of America ruined their retirement, Deborah and Ronald Goodin testified, and it may have ruined their marriage, too.

The Goodins, like many American families, made a bad business decision just as the Great Recession began. By 2009, they filed for bankruptcy. They never missed a payment into a bankruptcy trust that was supposed to take care of their mortgage.

But then a year after taxpayers gave Bank of America a $45 billion bailout, that bank took over the mortgage from another lender in August 2009, and Bank of America, which handles trillions of dollars of deposits, failed to file a routine legal motion that would give it access to the bankruptcy trust.

BOA like the other banks is in pursuit of foreclosures for many reasons. They have no right to foreclosure and the real creditor is being blocked out of the equation. The so-called investor doesn’t even know the foreclosure was filed. And they are contractually stopped from even inquiring, just as the Trustees of the REMIC Trusts don’t know anything, don’t have anything and are not allowed to do anything or ask anything.

The plain truth is that BOA and other banks are pursuing foreclosures not because they are the lender or a successor to a lender or even an authorized representative of the real creditor. They are actually using the illusion of a default and foreclosure to cover up the fact that they are really suing for themselves — even if they are not the lender, the successor or authorized representatives. They are getting title to homes in which they have no investment.

SO THE FREE HOUSE IS GOING TO BOA AND OTHER BANKS, NOT THE BORROWER.

ORDERED:

1. Bank of America’s Motion to Amend Pleadings is DENIED.

2. The Court intends to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Ronald and Deborah Goodin and against Bank of America in the amount of $204,000 once attorneys’ fees have been decided. The Goodins have until July 15, 2015 to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, and Bank of America has until August 10, 2015 to respond.

DONE AND ORDERED

23 June 2015 Timothy J Corrigan Goodin v Bank of America Jacksonville Florida

Reference Info:Federal, 11th Circuit, Florida | United States

WHAT A FARCE! Quel Decepcion mas Grande! Californians TAKE NOTE: the Homeowners’ Bill of Rights is a PLACEBO and neither the State Legislature nor the Attorney General will do anything for you!

Because of my recent association with Mid-Cities Escrow in Downey, I ended up spending Wednesday evening at the Whittier Community Center to listen to retiring California Assembly Majority Leader Charles Calderon, California Department of Justice Attorney Brian Nelson, and several others explain how much absolute nothing the state of California is doing to prevent the erosion of property rights in this state.

Oh there was abundant fake sympathy and useless non-advice handed out but AT LEAST the State Government showed it cared enough to pretend to educate the people, right?  It was all pretense, it was all fake, it was all pointless.  Californians basically have been thrown a few wet sponges to sop up the blood from the mortal wounds on their bleeding rights to integrity of contract and their right to own property.

State Assemblyman Calderon explained, somewhat gingerly, that “politics” was to blame: by which he meant though he could not say that the Banking interests and their minions own this state and only a radical revolution will change that.

Citizen after Citizen stood up and told their horror stories of negotiating or otherwise dealing with JP Morgan Chase, the Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citibank, and GMAC.  The reality is that the much ballyhooed California Homeowners’ Bill of Rights, passed by the legislature and signed into law last July, is a PLACEBO, and not a very sweetly sugar coated one at at that.

To his credit, State DOJ Attorney Brian Nelson briefly mentioned that this state’s tradition of non-judicial foreclosure has created problems for homeowners.  To his discredit, State DOJ Attorney Brian Nelson, in response to my question about whether anyone in the Attorney General’s Office was concerned about the unconstitutionality of California Civil Code §2924 et seq., merely said that the California Homeowners’ Bill of Rights at least might have overruled the holding of Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loanthat a California homeowner does not even have standing to ask who owns his loan.  See,192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2322, 2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2681 (February 18, 2011, Review denied May 18, 2011).

Nobody wants to deal with the critical problems of how the California Civil Code as enhanced and implemented by the Bank-Controlled Lawyers, Judges, and Legislators has created an impossible situation where the letter of the law means nothing because the express rules of the California Commercial Code and Anglo-American Common Law are directly contrary to how the State and Federal Courts apply and enforce non-judicial foreclosure in this state: WITH NO RULES OF CONSISTENCY OR PROOF OF STANDING OR OWNERSHIP AT ALL.

Non-Judicial Foreclosure is the Communist Manifesto’s dream technique of expropriating private property through centralized credit.  Private property is rapidly evaporating in this country, and neither the National Mortgage Settlement (with the Big Five Banks) nor the California Independent Monitor Program, nor any other branch or office of the State or Federal Government has any intention of addressing these basic, systemic problems.

Of course, nobody dared to mention how the Communist Manifesto of February 1848 is about to be fulfilled in its most basic planks and propositions: the abolition of private property in real estate and the abolition of the family as the basic unit of society.

For further information call Liana Peshkapia-Cadena at Mid-Cities Escrow in Downey: (562) 904-3151 or (562) 904-3152, Facsimile: (562) 861-2251.

A case to watch 09-cv-9784 S.D.N.Y.: Deutsche Bank, AG v Bank of America; Complaint Showing that there’s No Honor Among Thieves (aka–in the absence of Fresh Carrion, The Vultures are starting to Feed on Each Other!)

Updates: March 23, 2011 Opinion: 778_F-2.Supp.2d_375 and an unpublished decision in a closely related case before the same Judge Sweet: 08-30-2011 BNP Paribas Mortg Corp v Bank of America NA 2011 WL 3847376.  March 17, 2010 First Amended Complaint: 03-17-2010 USDC SDNY FAC Deutsche Bank v Bank of America 09-cv-9784-RWS

First Amended Complaint adding count for Breach of Fiduciary Duty regarding the Ocala Facility and Ocala Agreements.  Incredibly important litigation: “As late as August 3, 2009, BOA represented to DB that BOA owned and had control of mortgages valued at over one billion dollars securing DB’s investment.  In August 2009, following the bankruptcy of TBW, it was revealed that with respect to the great majority of those mortgages, BOA either never owned them in the first place or already had sold them to Freddie Mac without securing the proceeds of any such sale.”

Printable version of the Complaint attached when first published here on November 30, 2009, at 13:44 from San Clemente, California:

DEUTSCHE BANK, AG, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DEUTSCHE BANK, AG,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 09-cv-9784(RWS)  ECF Case

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG (“DB”), by and through its attorneys, Williams & Connolly

LLP, as and for its Complaint against Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), as successor

in interest to LaSalle Bank, National Association, alleges as follows:

NATURE OF CASE

1. This is an action for (1) damages for breach of contract resulting from BOA’s

failure to secure and safeguard over $1.25 billion worth of cash and mortgage loans that it was

contractually obligated to secure on behalf of DB and (2) contractual indemnity for the losses

caused by BOA’s negligent performance of its duties to DB.

2. On December 13, 2007, DB invested $750 million in asset-backed commercial

paper (“ABCP”) issued by a special purpose entity called Ocala Funding, LLC (“Ocala”).  On

June 30, 2008, DB increased this investment by approximately $450 million to a total

investment in Ocala’s ABCP of approximately $1.2 billion.  On June 30, 2008, BNP Paribas

Bank (“BNP,” and collectively with DB the “Secured Parties”) also invested approximately

$481 million in the ABCP issued by Ocala.  DB’s investment in Ocala was to be renewed on a

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monthly basis, and Ocala was required to maintain at least $1.25 billion in cash and collateral

as security against its obligations to DB.

3.   Ocala was established for the sole purpose of providing funding for mortgage

loans originated by Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“TBW”).  Mortgages purchased

by Ocala were required to conform to the requirements of, and were intended to be sold to, the

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), a government-sponsored entity

that is implicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.

4. Ocala’s ABCP was structured to minimize risks to DB’s investment.  Robust

contractual mechanisms existed to ensure that DB’s investment would be protected from credit

risk, market risk, interest rate risk, the risk of bankruptcy by TBW, and the counterparty risk

associated with dealing with TBW as originator of the mortgages.  In that regard, BOA

assumed the responsibility to act as trustee, collateral agent, custodian, and depositary agent on

behalf of the ABCP holders, including DB.

5. One vital mechanism protecting DB against risk was the requirement that DB’s

investment be at all times over-collateralized by a combination of cash and “dry” mortgages

purchased by Ocala.  “Dry” mortgages are mortgages that have been reviewed by the lender

and are actually in the lender’s possession at the time the mortgage loan is acquired by the

lender.  By contrast, “wet” funding of mortgages is riskier from the lender’s perspective

because financing is provided to a borrower before the mortgage note has been received and

reviewed by the lender (i.e., when the ink on the mortgage note is still “wet”).  The lender

providing wet funding for TBW was Colonial Bank (“Colonial”).  In making its investment in

Ocala on June 30, 2008, DB insisted that its investment be used only for dry mortgages.

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6. DB’s investment was further protected by the requirement that Ocala purchase

only mortgages that satisfied the requirements of Freddie Mac, and DB obtained assurances

from Freddie Mac that Freddie Mac would purchase mortgages held by Ocala in the event

TBW became ineligible to sell mortgages to Freddie Mac itself.  In short, DB’s investment was

required at all times to be secured by a combination of cash and dry mortgages that readily

could be sold to Freddie Mac.

7. A number of protections existed to ensure the reliability of the collateral

securing DB’s investment.  First, Ocala was permitted to purchase only fully-documented and

executed mortgages that were in the possession of a collateral agent representing the Secured Parties.

8. Second, the only purpose for which Ocala could use the funds invested by DB

(other than to repay DB or to cover other specified expenses) was to purchase such mortgages.

Any proceeds garnered from the subsequent sale of such mortgages were subject to the same limitation.

9. Third, the Ocala facility could continue operating only so long as the borrowing

base of cash and mortgages allocated to DB as collateral totaled at least $1.25 billion (the

Borrowing Base Condition”).  If the Borrowing Base Condition was not satisfied, the trustee

would trip this “circuit breaker” to suspend any further outflow of cash and to prevent the

automatic monthly renewal of DB’s investment.

10. These carefully crafted safeguards protecting DB’s investment from risk were

only as reliable as the gatekeeper who administered them.  To ensure that Ocala complied with

these measures, DB relied on a credit-worthy trustee/custodian/collateral and depositary agent

to serve as the gatekeeper that would at all times control: (1) the flow of mortgages into and out

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of Ocala; (2) the mortgages and cash that were to be held to secure DB’s investment; and (3) all

accounts in which Ocala’s funds were to be held or to which they were to be distributed.

11. BOA, as successor-in-interest to LaSalle Bank, N.A., assumed this gatekeeper

role.  By way of a series of contracts that governed the existence and activities of Ocala, BOA

accepted the responsibility to enforce the provisions that had been designed to protect DB’s

investment.  BOA represented that it would perform its duties with due care, and was obligated

by the contracts to do so.  It was BOA’s charge to ensure that Ocala at all times retained cash

and mortgages totaling at least $1.25 billion to secure DB’s investment (“DB Collateral”).

12. DB trusted that BOA, one of the nation’s largest and most well-known financial

institutions, would perform the gatekeeper function reasonably and responsibly.  DB’s

confidence was echoed by Moody’s Investors Service, which, in assigning Ocala an investment

grade rating, emphasized the importance of BOA’s role and stated that risk to DB and other

noteholders was “mitigated by the resources, capability and credit strength of BOA as the

trustee, collateral agent, depositary and custodian to provide critical program support services,

including: certifying the borrowing base and checking the delinquency triggers before the

issuance of Ocala’s ABCP; checking in the loan files and creating a collateral transmittal

report; and managing the orderly wind-down of the program.”  Moody’s ABCP Market Review

(July 13, 2009).

13. As it turned out, the faith of DB and other investors was misplaced.  In myriad

ways, BOA failed to carry out its various duties designed to protect DB’s investment, and these

failures substantially damaged Ocala and DB’s investment.

14. First, BOA transferred funds out of the Ocala accounts for unauthorized

purposes.  Ocala was permitted to purchase only dry mortgages, so the only legitimate transfers

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to purchase mortgages for Ocala were those made to an account specified on a bailee letter

from the lender who provided the wet funding for the mortgage.  Because Colonial was the

source of wet funding for TBW, BOA knew that there was only one such account—Account

No. 8026069354 held at Colonial called the Investor Funding Account (the “Colonial IFA”)—

into which Ocala funds could be transferred to purchase mortgages for Ocala.  BOA

nonetheless transferred hundreds of millions of dollars of DB’s investment to other accounts

with no connection to Ocala’s purchase of mortgages.  Further, notwithstanding the express

prohibition on Ocala’s purchase of wet mortgages, BOA nonetheless transferred more than $1.7

billion to a TBW account that BOA knew was used for wet funding of mortgages.  Finally,

even when BOA transferred funds to the Colonial IFA, the size of the transfers, contrary to the

requirements of the Ocala transaction documents, usually bore no relationship at all to the value

of mortgages that BOA understood were to be purchased by Ocala.

15. Second, BOA failed to track and document properly the purchase and sale of

mortgages as would be required for it to report accurately and protect adequately the Secured

Parties’ beneficial interest in the mortgages.  As late as July 2009, BOA represented to DB that

BOA had control of mortgages valued at over one billion dollars securing DB’s investment.  In

August 2009, following the bankruptcy of TBW, it was revealed that with respect to the great

majority of those mortgages, BOA either never had control of them in the first place or already

had sold them to Freddie Mac.

16. Third, BOA breached its express obligation to be able at all times to report to

Ocala and its investors the status of mortgages held by BOA for the benefit of the investors.

Not only did BOA breach this duty, it actually reported on a daily basis to DB that BOA was

holding certain loans as security for DB’s investment when, in reality, these loans already had

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been sold to third parties.  These misrepresentations led DB to believe that its investment was

at all times secured by $1.25 billion of collateral and hid the fact that an event of default

already had occurred under the Ocala facility documents that would have given DB the right to

accelerate the repayment of DB’s investment.

17. Fourth, BOA knew or should have known that the Borrowing Base Condition

was not satisfied for many months prior to the ultimate shut-down of the Ocala facility in

August 2009.  Yet, during that period BOA repeatedly certified and/or confirmed that the

Borrowing Base Condition was satisfied.  As a result, DB’s investment continued to roll over

on a monthly basis, and BOA continued to transfer funds out of Ocala that would have been

frozen had BOA correctly reported that the Borrowing Base Condition was not satisfied.

18. Fifth, BOA failed to segregate and account for the cash and collateral securing

DB’s investment.  The Ocala transaction documents required that funds invested by DB and

BNP and all mortgages purchased with such funds were to be accounted for separately to

protect DB’s and BNP’s security interests in their respective investments.  BOA nonetheless

regularly commingled the funds and failed to segregate effectively the parties’ collateral.  As a

result, BOA has been unable to allocate between DB and BNP what cash and collateral remains

in the Ocala accounts at BOA.

19. In short, BOA had the responsibility for (1) taking possession of mortgages,

checking them for completeness and compliance with the Ocala requirements, (2) paying for

fully-documented and executed mortgages by sending the appropriate amount to the Colonial

IFA, (3) preventing the transfer of Ocala funds for any purpose beyond what was contractually

specified, (4) ensuring that mortgages thus purchased remained within BOA’s control and/or

subject to a BOA lien until BOA obtained payment for such mortgages from a third party, (5)

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reporting accurately to DB the status of the collateral, (6) properly segregating the collateral

securing DB’s and BNP’s respective investments, and (7) renewing those investments on a

monthly basis only if the borrowing base fully secured those investments.  BOA failed to

comply with its contractual obligation to perform these tasks and to do so with due care.

20. Instead, BOA’s breaches of its contractual obligations and negligent acts and

omissions were the direct and proximate cause of the loss of DB’s investment in Ocala.  On

August 20, 2009, based upon an event of default, the Ocala ABCP held by DB totaling

$1,201,785,714 became immediately due and payable.  As a direct result of BOA’s contractual

breaches, Ocala was unable to pay this amount and failed to pay this amount to DB.  This

Complaint seeks to remedy that wrong.

PARTIES

21. Deutsche Bank is a bank organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of

Germany with a branch at 60 Wall Street, New York, New York 10005.

22. Bank of America is a bank organized under the laws of the State of North

Carolina with a branch a 9 West 57th Street, New York, New York 10019.  Bank of America is

successor in interest to LaSalle Bank, National Association, and assumed, by operation of law,

all of the liabilities and obligations of LaSalle Bank, National Association.  BOA has done and

is doing business in the State of New York.

JURISDICTION

23. Personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper in this Court because Bank of

America conducts business in New York and has agreed in Section 10.09 of the Second

Amended and Restated Security Agreement to irrevocably and unconditionally submit itself to

the jurisdiction of this Court.

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24. This Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as the

controversy is between a citizen of a State and a citizen of a foreign state and Plaintiff seeks

damages in an amount well in excess of $75,000.

25. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as BOA is a corporation subject to

personal jurisdiction in this District, and therefore is deemed a resident of this District pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

26. Venue in this district is also proper because BOA consented to the jurisdiction

of this Court pursuant to Section 10.09 of the Second Amended and Restated Security

Agreement, which provides:

EACH PARTY HERETO HEREBY SUBMITS TO THE

NONEXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW

YORK AND OF ANY NEW YORK STATE COURT SITTING IN

NEW YORK CITY FOR PURPOSES OF ALL LEGAL

PROCEEDINGS ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS

AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED

HEREBY. EACH PARTY HERETO IRREVOCABLY WAIVES,

TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, ANY

OBJECTION WHICH IT MAY NOW OR HEREAFTER HAVE TO

THE LAYING OF THE VENUE OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING

BROUGHT IN SUCH A COURT AND ANY CLAIM THAT ANY

SUCH PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN SUCH A COURT HAS

BEEN BROUGHT IN AN INCONVENIENT FORUM. EACH

PARTY HERETO HEREBY CONSENTS TO PROCESS BEING

SERVED IN ANY SUIT, ACTION OR PROCEEDING WITH

RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT, OR ANY DOCUMENT

DELIVERED PURSUANT HERETO BY THE MAILING OF A

COPY THEREOF BY REGISTERED OR CERTIFIED MAIL,

POSTAGE PREPAID, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, TO ITS

RESPECTIVE ADDRESS SPECIFIED AT THE TIME FOR

NOTICES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR TO ANY OTHER

ADDRESS OF WHICH IT SHALL HAVE GIVEN WRITTEN OR

ELECTRONIC NOTICE TO THE OTHER PARTIES. THE

FOREGOING SHALL NOT LIMIT THE ABILITY OF ANY

PARTY HERETO TO BRING SUIT IN THE COURTS OF ANY JURISDICTION.

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Section 17 of the Series 2008-1 Depositary Agreement contains a substantially similar forum

selection provision.

FACTUAL ALEGATIONS

I. Introduction

27. Prior to filing for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy

Code on August 25, 2009, TBW had been the 12th-largest mortgage originator in the U.S. and

third largest source for FHA loans, and had originated thousands of residential mortgages each

year.  As of August 4, 2009, TBW was servicing more than 400,000 mortgages with unpaid

principal balances in excess of $80 billion.

28. In order to originate mortgages in such volumes, TBW required access to

abundant and reliable financing.  In or about April 2005, the Ocala facility was created by

Lehman Brothers, at the direction of TBW, to serve as a single-seller whole-loan mortgage

warehouse conduit for TBW.  Ocala would issue and sell ABCP, the proceeds of which were to

be used to provide financing for fixed-rate Freddie Mac conforming mortgages originated by TBW.

29. On December 13, 2007, DB purchased $750 million of ABCP issued by Ocala

in the form of “Secured Liquidity Notes.”

30. Around six months later, on June 30, 2008, DB agreed to invest an additional

$450 million in Ocala’s ABCP.  Following this additional investment, DB held Secured

Liquidity Notes with a face value of $1,201,785,714.  Also on June 30, 2008, BNP purchased

Secured Liquidity Notes with a face value of $480,700,000.

31. Both DB and BNP renewed their investments in the Ocala ABCP on June 30, 2009.

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32. The Secured Liquidity Notes purchased by DB were designated “Series 2008-1”

(such notes are hereinafter referred to as “DB Secured Liquidity Notes”).  The collateral

securing DB’s investment was also identified with the designation “Series 2008-1.”

33. The Secured Liquidity Notes purchased by BNP were designated “Series 2005-

1” (such notes are hereinafter referred to as “BNP Secured Liquidity Notes”).  The collateral

securing BNP’s investment was also identified with the designation “Series 2005-1.”

34. The Secured Liquidity Notes, Ocala’s use of the funds provided to it thereby,

and other critical aspects of the Ocala facility were established and governed by a set of

agreements entered into on or about June 30, 2008 (“Ocala Agreements”).  The Ocala

Agreements amended and restated the agreements that had governed the Ocala facility prior to

June 30, 2008.

35. The basic operation of the Ocala facility was fairly straightforward.  Using the

funds that had been invested by DB, Ocala was to purchase dry mortgages from TBW.  Any

mortgages thus acquired would constitute collateral securing DB’s investment.  Ocala would

then sell the mortgages to Freddie Mac.  The proceeds of such sales also constituted collateral

securing DB’s investment.  As long as the Borrowing Base Condition was satisfied, the

proceeds of such sales could be used by Ocala to purchase additional mortgages from TBW,

and the cycle would begin anew.

36. A set of “Swap Agreements” served to transfer to TBW all market risk relating

to the mortgages purchased by Ocala.  Whether mortgages were sold for more or less than

expected, under the Swap Agreements, it would have no ultimate consequence for the value of

the DB Collateral or DB’s return on its investment.  The strict over-collateralization

requirements in conjunction with the Swap Agreements provided assurance that when DB

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redeemed the DB Secured Liquidity Notes, it would recover its entire $1.2 billion principal investment.

37. In short, as long as BOA performed its various roles under the Ocala

Agreements with appropriate care, DB’s principal investment was to be fully secured and

protected, and DB would receive the interest payments provided for in the Secured Liquidity Notes.

II. The Ocala Agreements

38. The Ocala Agreements executed on or about June 30, 2008 included the following:

a. The Second Amended and Restated Mortgage Loan Purchase and

Servicing Agreement (“MLPSA”) was entered into between Ocala, as Purchaser, and TBW, as

Seller and Servicer.  DB was expressly designated as a third-party beneficiary of the MLPSA in

Section 12.15.

b.  The Second Amended and Restated Security Agreement (“Security

Agreement”) was entered into between Ocala, as Issuer, and BOA, as Indenture Trustee and

Custodian.  DB was expressly designated as a third-party beneficiary of the Security

Agreement in Section 10.18.

c. The Second Amended and Restated Custodial Agreement (“Custodial

Agreement”) was entered into among Ocala, as Issuer, TBW, as Seller and Servicer, and BOA,

as Custodian and Collateral Agent.  DB was expressly designated as a third-party beneficiary of

the Custodial Agreement in Section 25.  Furthermore BOA, as Custodial Agent, agreed to

indemnify DB against any losses that DB may sustain to the extent attributable to BOA’s

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“negligence, fraud, bad faith or willful misconduct” in the performance of its duties as

Custodial Agent.  Custodial Agreement § 17.

d. The Second Amended and Restated Base Indenture (“Base Indenture”)

and the Series 2008-1 Supplement to the Base Indenture were entered into between Ocala, as

Issuer, and BOA, as Indenture Trustee and Paying Agent.  DB was expressly designated as a

third-party beneficiary of the Base Indenture in Section 13.20.

e. The Series 2008-1 Depositary Agreement (“Depositary Agreement”)

was entered into between Ocala, as Issuer, and BOA, as Series 2008-1 Depositary.  DB is a

third party beneficiary of the Depositary Agreement pursuant to an indemnification provision in

Section 8(g).  Furthermore, the Indenture Trustee is a third-party beneficiary of the Depositary

Agreement that may enforce its provisions under Section 15.  DB, as the beneficiary of the

Base Indenture, may enforce the rights of the Indenture Trustee under the Depositary

Agreement because BOA’s dual role as both Indenture Trustee and Depositary Agent creates,

with respect to the Depositary Agreement, a conflict of interest for BOA as Indenture Trustee.

III. Parties to the Ocala Agreements

39. The parties to the Ocala Agreements each performed multiple roles with respect to the Ocala facility.

40. DB, by virtue of its investment of $1.2 billion and acquisition of the DB Secured

Liquidity Notes, obtained rights and privileges under the Ocala Agreements as a “Noteholder,”

a “Series 2008-1 Senior Noteholder,” a “Required Senior Noteholder,” and a “Secured Party.” 

41. DB also was a party to the Swap Agreements that served to relieve investors in

Ocala’s ABCP of market risk relating to the mortgages acquired by Ocala.  Pursuant to those

agreements, DB held the roles of “Front Swap Counterparty” and “Back Swap Counterparty.”

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DB’s participation in these two agreements was part of an arrangement that served to transfer

all market risk regarding the value of mortgages from Ocala to DB, and then from DB to TBW.

42. Ocala primarily performed three roles.

a. As “Purchaser,” Ocala would buy from TBW mortgages that would then

be sold directly or indirectly to Freddie Mac.

b. As “Issuer,” Ocala issued ABCP, including the Secured Liquidity Notes.

c. As “Front Swap Counterparty,” Ocala was insulated against any market

risk.  Ocala would not have to absorb various types of potential losses on the mortgages, and by

the same token, would not be able to retain potential profits on the mortgages.

43. TBW primarily performed three roles.

a. As “Seller,” TBW would originate mortgages and sell those mortgages to Ocala.

b. As “Servicer,” TBW serviced loans held by Ocala, performing such

functions as collecting monthly loan payments from mortgagees, handling mortgagees’ escrow

accounts, and paying taxes and insurance from such escrow accounts.

c. As “Back Swap Counterparty,” TBW took on all market risk related to

DB’s investment by agreeing to absorb various types of potential losses on the mortgages. By

the same token, TBW would receive any potential profits on the mortgages.

44. BOA assumed several pivotal roles through which BOA was to secure the DB

Collateral, as well as manage and oversee the accounts into which proceeds from the sales of

loans by Ocala were deposited and from which payments for the purchase of mortgages were drawn:

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a. As “Collateral Agent,” BOA assumed responsibility to hold for the

benefit of DB the security interest in mortgages purchased by Ocala using funds invested by

DB, among other responsibilities, and was authorized to serve as an agent of DB.  As Collateral

Agent, BOA also held and controlled the funds generated by DB’s investment and the

subsequent sale of mortgages, and was permitted to transfer those funds only under certain

specified conditions and for limited purposes.  See Security Agreement §§ 4.01-4.10, 5.01-5.07.

b. As “Custodian,” BOA assumed responsibility to review loan files before

they were purchased by Ocala to ensure they complied with the Ocala Agreements, among

other responsibilities, and was required to take possession of the mortgages and loan documents

acquired by Ocala and hold them for the benefit of the Collateral Agent as representative of

DB.  See Custodial Agreement §§ 3, 20.

c. As “Indenture Trustee,” BOA assumed numerous responsibilities in

connection with the Ocala facility, including the establishment and maintenance of accounts

necessary to allocate and distribute interest payable to the Ocala investors.  Base Indenture §

5.1; Base Indenture Supplement § 3.5(a), (b).

d. As “Depositary,” BOA was required, among other responsibilities, to roll

over the Secured Liquidity Notes on a monthly basis only after certifying that (i) it had all the

necessary information to certify the Borrowing Base Condition and (ii) the Borrowing Base

Condition was, in fact, satisfied.

e. As “Paying Agent,” BOA assumed responsibility to pay DB amounts

owed to it pursuant to the Ocala Agreements.  Base Indenture Supplement §§ 3.3(b), (d); 3.4(b), (d).

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IV. Cash and Collateral Cycle

45. The Ocala Agreements and various bailee letters accompanying the transfer of

mortgages established a predictable cycle of cash and collateral through the Ocala facility.

46. TBW would originate a mortgage with wet funding provided by Colonial, i.e.,

TBW would transfer Colonial funds to the borrower at the closing while the loan documents

were still being signed.

47. In exchange for providing the funds for the closing, Colonial obtained a security

interest in the mortgage thus originated.  Once closing was complete and the promissory note

and other loan documents had all been signed, the complete set of loan documents was

delivered to Colonial.

48. After receiving the loan documents, Colonial would then deliver the loan

documents to BOA as Custodian for Ocala accompanied by a bailee letter (“Colonial Bailee

Letter”) indicating that the loan documents were being transferred under bailment, subject to

Colonial’s security interest.  The Colonial Bailee Letter provided that Colonial would release

its security interest in the loan documents upon payment of and confirmed receipt of a specified

“takeout amount” that represented Ocala’s purchase of the mortgages.  The Colonial Bailee

Letter provided very precise instructions to BOA as to how payment was to be made, and

explicitly stated that Colonial’s security interest in the loan documents would be released only

if BOA made full payment “as set forth” in the Colonial Bailee Letter.  The Colonial Bailee

Letters required that the necessary payment be transmitted to the Colonial IFA.

49. The Ocala Agreements required TBW to provide BOA with a Transfer

Supplement, which was a list of mortgages that TBW proposed that Ocala purchase on any given day.

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50. Within two business days of receipt of the loan documents (via the Colonial

Bailee Letter) for the mortgages listed on the applicable Transfer Supplement, BOA, as

Custodian, was required to review the loan documents and deliver a certificate to the Collateral

Agent (also BOA) certifying whether it had received all of the loan documents related to the

mortgage to be purchased and specifying any deficiencies in the loan documents.

51. Once BOA, as Custodian, confirmed that the loan documents were complete

(i.e., that the mortgages were now dry), BOA, as Collateral Agent, was to transmit to Colonial

the takeout amount, drawn on the appropriate sub-account of the Ocala collateral account

(“Collateral Account”) held at BOA—the sub-account either of DB (the “DB Sub-Account

or BNP (the “BNP Sub-Account”).

52. BOA was permitted to transfer funds to Colonial only after it had confirmed that

BOA was in possession of all necessary loan documents such that once BOA paid the correct

take-out amount, it would become the owner of the mortgages for the benefit of Ocala.

53. Pursuant to the Colonial Bailee Letter, once BOA transmitted the correct takeout

amount to Colonial in accordance with the instructions in the Colonial Bailee Letter, Colonial’s

security interest in the loan documents would be released.

54. By operation of the Ocala Agreements, Ocala immediately pledged any

mortgage thus purchased, including the loan documents, to BOA as the Collateral Agent on

behalf of the appropriate Secured Party under the Security Agreement.

55. The Ocala facility was not permitted to hold mortgages and loan documents for

longer than sixty (60) days, and only 10% by value of the mortgages held by Ocala were

permitted to be held longer than thirty days.   MLPSA, Ex. H.  The expectation of all parties

was that shortly after purchasing a mortgage, Ocala would sell the mortgage to Freddie Mac.

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56. At the start of the sale process, BOA, as Collateral Agent, would deliver the loan

files to Colonial subject to a form of bailee letter required by the Custodial Agreement (“BOA

Bailee Letter”).  Custodial Agreement, Ex. E.  The BOA Bailee Letter specified that BOA

retained its security interest in the loan documents until payment was made pursuant to the

instructions in the letter.  The BOA Bailee Letter required that, within fifteen days, Colonial, as

Freddie Mac’s agent, either return the mortgages or remit payment.

57. Freddie Mac could pay for the mortgages in two ways.  First, if Freddie Mac

were simply purchasing the mortgage for its own account, it would pay with cash deposited

directly into the Ocala Collateral Account at BOA.  Alternatively, if mortgages acquired by

Freddie Mac were part of a group of mortgages being bundled together as part of a

securitization, Freddie Mac would deliver a trust certificate to Bank of New York, the securities

clearing agent, who would transmit the proceeds of the sale of this certificate to Colonial,

which would then in turn transmit the proceeds to the Ocala Collateral Account.

58. BOA’s security interest in the mortgages was to be released only upon payment

by Colonial of the purchase price specified in the applicable BOA Bailee Letter.

59. The proceeds of the sale of the mortgage to Freddie Mac were then to be

deposited in the sub-account of the Ocala Collateral Account from which the funds to purchase

that mortgage originally had been drawn.

V. BOA’s Breach of Its Contractual Duties

60. BOA—like all of the parties to the Ocala Agreements—understood and agreed

that the primary “purpose” of the Security Agreement, as clearly stated in its Recitals, was

“securing and providing for the repayment of all amounts at any time and from time to time

owing by the Issuer to each [Secured Party].”  Indeed, the entire Ocala facility was directed at

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only two purposes: to provide liquidity for TBW to originate mortgages and to protect the

Secured Parties’ investment.

61. BOA’s responsibilities and duties under the Ocala Agreements were likewise

intended to provide multiple layers of protection to preserve the Secured Parties’ investment.

BOA was required to carry out these responsibilities and duties with appropriate care, and each

one of the Ocala Agreements provided that BOA could be liable in the event it performed those

duties negligently.

62. With respect to virtually every key contractual duty required of it under the

Ocala Agreements, BOA failed to act with appropriate care.  BOA’s negligence subverted the

key protections upon which DB depended.  BOA’s breaches of its contractual duties and

negligence in performing those duties caused DB’s investment in Ocala to become severely

under-collateralized and directly has resulted in Ocala being unable to pay amounts owed to

DB under the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

A. Improper Transfer of Funds from the Collateral Account

63. To protect the funds in the Collateral Account and DB Sub-Account that

ultimately would be used to repay the approximate $1.2 billion in principal invested by DB, the

Ocala Agreements imposed very strict and very clear restrictions on the purposes for which the

funds could be used.

64. Section 8.28 of the Base Indenture permitted funds invested by DB to be used

for two, and only two, purposes:

Section 8.28   Use of Proceeds of Notes.  The

Issuer shall use the proceeds of Notes solely for

one or more of the following purposes: (a) to pay

the Issuer’s Obligations when due, in accordance

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with the Security Agreement; and (b) to acquire

Mortgage Loans from the Seller.

65. Control of all of the funds invested by DB was entrusted to BOA, as Collateral

Agent.  Section 5.01 of the Security Agreement provides that BOA as Collateral Agent was

required to maintain “a special purpose trust account in the name of and under the control of,

the Collection Agent on behalf of the Secured Parties (said account being herein called the

“Collateral Account” . . .) and sub-accounts thereof for each of the Series 2005-1 Purchased

Assets and the Series 2008-1 Purchased Assets.”

66. Section 5.01 of the Security Agreement further provides that BOA, as Collateral

Agent, “shall have complete dominion and control over the Collateral Account and the Issuer

hereby agrees that only the Collateral Agent may make withdrawals from the Collateral Account.”

67. Section 5.03 of the Security Agreement authorizes BOA to make withdrawals or

transfers from the Collateral Account and/or DB and BNP Sub-Accounts only for certain

enumerated purposes.  The only permitted transfers out of the Collateral Account and/or the

DB and BNP Sub-Accounts for purposes other than the purchase of mortgages were limited

transfers to Ocala swap transaction participants and the holders of Ocala ABCP and

subordinated notes in accordance with the Ocala Agreements.  The only legitimate transfer out

of the Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts to third parties other than

those swap transaction participants and the holders of Ocala ABCP and subordinated notes was

for the purchase of dry mortgages.

68. BOA knew that the only manner in which dry mortgages could be purchased

from TBW was through payments to the Colonial IFA.  BOA knew this because all mortgages

TBW delivered to BOA as Custodian for review and potential purchase by Ocala were

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accompanied by Colonial Bailee Letters specifying that payment for the mortgages had to be

directed to the Colonial IFA, and that only payment to that exact account would result in the

release of Colonial’s security interest in the mortgages.

69. Despite this knowledge, since June 30, 2008, BOA nonetheless transferred more

than $3.7 billion from the Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts to

accounts that had no legitimate basis for receiving such funds under the Security Agreement

and that were not related to the purchase of dry mortgages for Ocala.  These improper transfers included:

a. Approximately $1.7 billion to TBW Account No. 722347.2 (the “Wet

Funding Account”) held at BOA that was used to provide wet funding for mortgages.

b. Approximately $837 million to a “FHLMC P&I Custodial Account,” an

account to accumulate principal and interest for loans serviced by TBW for Freddie Mac;

c. Approximately $675 million to a “Custodial Funds Clearing Account,”

an account for the initial deposit of funds relating to mortgages serviced by TBW;

d. Approximately $445 million to a “Colonial Master Account,” an account

to fund loans made to settlement agents (i.e., the title company or attorney closing the loan for TBW);

e. Approximately $58 million to a “Colonial Operating Account,” an

account to fund TBW’s operating expenses; and

f. Approximately $2.5 million to an “ITF Henley Holdings Account,” an

account to accumulate principal and interest relating to loans serviced for Henley Holdings LLC.

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70. These unauthorized transfers began on July 1, 2008, the day after the Ocala

Agreements became effective, and continued through August 2009.

71. Moreover, between June 30, 2008 and August 4, 2009, BOA transferred over $1

billion to Colonial and other banks in numerous transfers of whole/round number amounts that

bore no relation to any purchase of mortgages.  Whole/round number transfers to purchase

mortgages would be highly unusual because the aggregation of individual mortgages

themselves would not typically be expected to result in whole/round number amounts.

72. Furthermore, the payments made by BOA to the Colonial IFA on a daily basis

bore no relationship to the value of the mortgages being purchased.  On average, BOA, on

behalf of Ocala, would receive approximately $40-50 million of mortgages for purchase each

day.  In order to pay for those mortgages, BOA was required to pay an amount equal to the face

value of the mortgages to the Colonial IFA.

73. On some days, BOA failed to transmit the funds to the Colonial IFA necessary

to complete the purchase of those mortgages.  For example, on February 27, 2009, BOA

transmitted only $8.8 million to Colonial despite the fact that BOA’s records indicated that

$54.5 million in mortgages were acquired from Colonial that day for the benefit of DB.  By

failing to transmit payment for the mortgages, BOA prevented Ocala from perfecting the

security interests in those mortgages that was intended to serve as the primary collateral for

DB’s investment.  BOA nonetheless represented in daily reports to DB that the security

interests had been perfected by accounting for the mortgages as collateral securing DB’s investment.

74. On other days, BOA transmitted far more money to the Colonial IFA than was

warranted to purchase the mortgages that BOA’s records indicate were acquired by BOA for

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the benefit of Ocala.  For example, on May 29, 2009, BOA transmitted the large sum of $690

million to the Colonial IFA, despite the fact that BOA’s own records indicate that only $36.7

million in mortgages were acquired from Colonial that day for the benefit of Ocala.  By

conducting such transfers, BOA permitted the funds invested by DB to be transferred out of

Ocala without obtaining mortgages in return.

75. Prior to June 30, 2008, the agreements governing Ocala permitted it to purchase

wet mortgages, and, prior to June 30, 2008, BOA regularly transferred Ocala funds to the Wet

Funding Account to purchase wet mortgages.

76. The Ocala Agreements that became effective on June 30, 2008, however,

prohibited the purchase of wet mortgages and, therefore, prohibited the transfer of Ocala funds

to the Wet Funding Account.  After June 30, 2008, BOA disregarded this requirement and

nonetheless continued to transfer Ocala funds to the Wet Funding Account in contravention of

the Ocala Agreements.  In fact, on July 1, 2008, the day after the Ocala Agreements became

effective, BOA transferred $63,939,570 from the DB Sub-Account to the Wet Funding

Account.

77. The transfer of funds by BOA out of the Collateral Account and/or DB and BNP

Sub-Accounts to accounts that BOA knew or should have known had no permissible purpose,

and to the Colonial IFA in amounts that bore no relationship to the value of mortgages

supposedly being purchased, was a direct cause of the loss of the DB Collateral and, therefore,

the loss of a substantial portion of DB’s investment in Ocala.

78. Under the Security Agreement, BOA was not authorized to release any Ocala

funds for the purchase of mortgages unless the Borrowing Base Condition was satisfied.  From

June 30, 2008 through August 2009, BOA regularly breached its obligation to ensure that no

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funds were transferred from the Ocala Collateral Account or the DB or BNP Sub-Accounts

when the Borrowing Base Condition was not satisfied.  BOA’s transfer of Ocala funds out of

the Collateral Account the DB or BNP Sub-Accounts in contravention of this obligation

directly and proximately caused the loss of a substantial portion of DB’s investment in Ocala.

B. BOA’s Misrepresentations of the State of DB Collateral

79. As both Custodian and Collateral Agent, BOA was required to know at all times

which mortgages it physically held at its facility, which mortgages had been delivered under

the required BOA Bailee Letter and which mortgages had been purchased by third parties. 

80. During the summer of 2008, DB requested that BOA provide it with a daily list

of the mortgage loans and cash held by BOA as DB Collateral, so that DB would know on a

daily basis that its investment was secured by $1.25 billion of collateral in accordance with the

Ocala Agreements.

81. BOA was required under the Custodial Agreement to have such information

readily available.  Section 9.1 of the Custodial Agreement required BOA to be able to provide

to Ocala, upon one business day’s notice, a list of all mortgages held for the benefit of DB,

including all mortgages “paid off, repurchased, sold or otherwise released by [BOA].”

Custodial Agreement § 9.1.  In other words, BOA was required to be able to tell Ocala and its

investors at any given time the status of the mortgages held by BOA as collateral for the benefit of investors.

82. In connection with its duties under the Custodial Agreement, BOA agreed to

provide DB with a daily report of all such mortgage loans (the “BOA Loan Reports”), and

began transmitting these reports to DB in September 2008.  The BOA Loan Reports listed each

mortgage loan held by BOA for the benefit of DB, and noted whether the loan was either still

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in the physical possession of BOA or out to a prospective third party purchaser pursuant to a

BOA Bailee Letter.  Having assumed this additional daily reporting obligation, BOA was

required to perform it in a non-negligent manner.

83. In August 2009, after TBW collapsed, DB discovered that the BOA Loan

Reports were false.  For example, the August 12, 2009 BOA Loan Report showed that there

was approximately $1,160,530,265 in mortgages securing DB’s investment.  BOA’s own

internal information, however, shows that at least $470 million of these mortgages already had

been delivered and sold to Freddie Mac at least two weeks prior to the date of the BOA Loan

Report and so could not have constituted collateral securing DB’s investment.  Further, on

information and belief, as of August 12, 2009, there were virtually no mortgages held by BOA

to secure DB’s investment.

84. This false reporting of the state of the collateral securing DB’s investment began

almost a year prior to TBW’s collapse.  For example, on September 15, 2008, the date on

which BOA delivered the first BOA Loan Report, BOA represented that the amount of

mortgages securing DB’s investment was approximately $1,147,268,192.  BOA’s own internal

information, however, shows that only about half of these mortgages totaling about $538

million were either still on hand or had not been delivered and/or sold to Freddie Mac.

85. On information and belief, hundreds (and potentially all) of the BOA Loan

Reports delivered by BOA to DB during the period between September 15, 2008 and August 4,

2009 were similarly false.

86. Had BOA properly reported the amount of mortgages securing DB’s investment,

DB would have known of the under-collateralization of its investment, and could have

prevented the loss of its investment.

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C. BOA’s Failure to Secure the Mortgages

87. As both Custodian and Collateral Agent, BOA was responsible for maintaining

custody and control of the mortgages that secured DB’s investment.

88. In August 2009, however, after TBW and Colonial collapsed, DB discovered

that BOA did not have ownership, possession, or control of virtually any of the mortgages that

were listed on the BOA Loan Reports.

89. BOA has been unable to produce the mortgages that it represented to DB as

being held by BOA on behalf of DB.  Moreover, BOA has been unable to account for where

the mortgages are or even to establish that the mortgages were ever purchased by Ocala. 

90. BOA’s inability to produce or account for the mortgages that were supposed to

be the collateral for DB’s investment stems from, among other things, BOA’s failure to keep

records concerning the purchase and sale of mortgages on behalf of Ocala.

91. With respect to the purchase of mortgages, BOA failed to maintain the internal

documentation necessary to establish Ocala’s ownership of purchased mortgages.  BOA

recently admitted to DB that it failed to maintain loan level detail with respect to the mortgages

it purchased.  As such, BOA has been unable to prove with specificity that it paid for any

particular mortgage or that it was paid by third parties for particular mortgages.

92. BOA also failed to obtain documentation from third parties necessary to

establish Ocala’s purchase and ownership of mortgages.  BOA failed to obtain letters from

Colonial confirming Colonial’s release of its security interest with respect to particular

mortgages for which BOA transmitted payment to Colonial.

93. BOA’s failure to obtain such documentation was particularly egregious because

BOA was fully aware that Colonial was TBW’s and/or Freddie Mac’s agent with respect to the

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sale of mortgages by Ocala to Freddie Mac.  BOA, therefore, would have to transfer mortgages

back to Colonial (as Freddie Mac’s agent) pursuant to a BOA Bailee Letter after having

purchased the mortgages from Colonial (as TBW’s agent).  The possibility existed that once

BOA transferred the mortgages to Colonial, Colonial could assert ownership of the mortgages

and refuse to either return the mortgages or remit payment received from Freddie Mac for the

mortgages unless BOA could prove that Colonial’s security interest had been released.  This

made it even more critical that BOA document that it properly had taken the steps necessary to

release Colonial’s security interest in the mortgages, and that Colonial had in fact released that interest.

94. On information and belief, Colonial, and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (“FDIC”) acting as receiver for Colonial, asserts that mortgages for which BOA

claimed to have paid Colonial, and in which BOA claimed to hold a security interest on behalf

of DB, in fact, belonged to Colonial.  Colonial, and/or the FDIC acting as receiver for Colonial,

contend that BOA never remitted payment to Colonial as required in the Colonial Bailee

Letters pursuant to which the mortgages had initially been transferred by Colonial to BOA. 

95. BOA also failed to maintain proper documentation and to track mortgages over

which it had asserted control and that it subsequently released to prospective third-party purchasers.

96. Pursuant to Section 8 of the Custodial Agreement, BOA as Custodian was

authorized to release mortgages to prospective third-party purchasers only if BOA

accompanied delivery of the mortgage with a BOA Bailee Letter to be executed by the

purchaser.  BOA was further required to collect all transmittal letters executed by prospective

third-party purchasers.

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97. The contractually-required form of the BOA Bailee Letter was set forth in

Exhibit E to the Custodial Agreement, and provided that the third-party purchaser either return

the mortgage or remit the sales proceeds within fifteen days from the date of the letter.  Section

8 of the Custodial Agreement further required that if a prospective third-party purchaser to

whom BOA as Custodian delivered mortgages for review did not proceed with the proposed

purchase, the mortgages were to be returned promptly to BOA as Custodian.

98. BOA as Custodian and Collateral Agent failed to ensure that third-party

purchasers to whom it had transmitted loans for purchase complied with the fifteen-day time

period.  On information and belief, BOA failed even to collect executed copies of transmittal

letters.  The failure of BOA as Custodian and Collateral Agent to promptly recover the

mortgages from third-party purchasers after the fifteen-day time period had passed was a

breach of BOA’s contractual duties and duty of due care and violated customary standards

applicable to an entity charged with maintaining continuous custody and control of mortgages.

99. BOA further breached its duties as Custodian and Collateral Agent by failing to

keep track of the Ocala mortgages that were being sold to Freddie Mac.  In connection with

those sales, Freddie Mac required that BOA submit a specific form of release known as Form

996E, which contained a list of the mortgages to be sold to Freddie Mac.  In contravention of

its contractual duties, BOA failed to keep track of or verify when these Form 996Es were being

submitted to Freddie Mac and which Ocala mortgages were to be sold to Freddie Mac.

100. In dereliction of its responsibilities as Custodian and Collateral Agent, BOA

regularly made no effort to recover mortgages worth hundreds of millions of dollars delivered

to prospective third-party purchasers for review, even after sixty days or more had elapsed

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without the prospective purchasers remitting payment or returning the mortgages as required by

the BOA Bailee Letters.

101. By August 12, 2009, BOA had allowed approximately $158 million of

mortgages delivered by it to prospective third-party purchasers to remain outstanding for more

than sixty days, notwithstanding the fifteen-day limit set forth in the BOA Bailee Letters.

When Colonial went into FDIC receivership, it was too late for BOA to recover the mortgages. 

102. As Custodian and Collateral Agent, BOA’s negligent failure to maintain custody

and control of Mortgages in accordance with the Ocala Agreements, the contractually required

BOA Bailee Letters, and customary standards caused the loss of the DB Collateral and,

therefore, the loss of a substantial portion of DB’s investment.

D. BOA’s False Certifications of the Borrowing Base Condition

103. BOA also failed to properly carry out another of its key responsibilities—the

responsibility to review, certify, and/or confirm that the Borrowing Base Condition was met.  If

BOA had correctly calculated the Borrowing Base Condition, it would have been required to

take actions that effectively would have shut down the Ocala facility and prevented any further

depletion of the DB Collateral.

104.  The Borrowing Base Condition was a built-in “circuit breaker” that was

designed to prevent further deterioration of the cash and collateral in the event that the cash and

collateral securing DB’s investment declined to the point that repayment of DB’s principal was at risk.

105. The Borrowing Base Condition was a calculation that essentially measured the

indebtedness of Ocala (primarily consisting of its obligations to noteholders) against its assets

(primarily consisting of cash and mortgages).  This would reveal whether the DB Secured

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Liquidity Notes were adequately secured in accordance with the Ocala Agreements.  If DB’s

investment was not so secured, then the facility would be in violation of the Borrowing Base

Condition, and this would trigger two important consequences: (1) the Secured Liquidity Notes

would not be rolled over, but instead would become immediately due and payable, and/or (2)

no new purchases of mortgages would be permitted, thus halting Ocala’s outlay of further cash,

unless and until the Borrowing Base Condition was again satisfied.

106. It was BOA’s contractual responsibility to ensure that the Borrowing Base

Condition was satisfied before permitting the Secured Liquidity Notes to be rolled over or

permitting Ocala to transfer funds for the purpose of purchasing additional mortgages.

107. Pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement, BOA as Depositary was

precluded from issuing or delivering any Secured Liquidity Notes unless it received from Ocala

a completed certificate demonstrating that the Borrowing Base Condition was met, and then

BOA “upon review, determined that it can (and it does) certify as to [satisfaction of the

Borrowing Base Condition]”  The Secured Liquidity Notes had a thirty day maturity.  Thus,

each month BOA had the obligation to review and certify a calculation establishing whether the

DB Secured Liquidity Notes were secured by $1.25 billion of collateral.

108. As BOA acknowledged orally to DB and in a letter to BNP dated March 27,

2009, BOA’s duty to certify whether the Borrowing Base Condition was met pursuant to

Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement “play[ed] an important role in mitigating the risks”

that the Secured Parties “would otherwise incur.”

109. Furthermore, pursuant to Sections 5.03(a) and (b) of the Security Agreement,

BOA as Collateral Agent was precluded from transferring or withdrawing funds from the

Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts for the purpose of enabling Ocala to

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purchase additional mortgages from TBW unless the Borrowing Base Condition was met.

Thus, on every occasion BOA transferred funds to pay for Ocala’s acquisition of new

mortgages, BOA was required first to confirm whether the DB Secured Liquidity Notes were fully secured.

110. BOA regularly certified and/or confirmed that the Borrowing Base Condition

was met when, based on BOA’s own information, BOA knew or should have known that, in

fact, the Borrowing Base Condition was far from satisfied.  The key to the Borrowing Base

Condition was determining whether Ocala actually held $1.25 billion in cash and mortgages

securing the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.  This was a determination that only BOA could make

because only BOA knew what mortgages it held in its vault and which mortgages already had

been sold to Freddie Mac.  BOA knew what mortgages had been sold to Freddie Mac because,

as a condition of each sale to Freddie Mac, BOA was required to execute a Freddie Mac Form

996E that served as a release of the security interest in the Ocala mortgages to be sold to Freddie Mac.

111. On information and belief, from June 30, 2008, through August 4, 2009, BOA,

on hundreds of occasions, either falsely certified or failed in its contractual duty to confirm that

the Borrowing Base Condition was satisfied.

112. BOA has failed to provide DB with the vast majority of Borrowing Base

Condition certificates.  The few certificates that BOA provided are clearly and demonstrably

false showing that DB’s investment was severely under-collateralized:

a.  On May 20, 2009, BOA certified that it held mortgages worth

$1,134,028,581 as DB Collateral.  In reality, on May 20, 2009, BOA knew or should have

known that it held or had a lien on approximately $547 million in mortgages as DB Collateral.

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b.  On June 20, 2009, BOA certified that it held mortgages worth

$1,208,009,892 as DB Collateral.  In reality, on June 20, 2009, BOA knew or should have

known that it held or had a lien on approximately $440 million in mortgages as DB Collateral.

c.  On June 30, 2009, BOA certified that it held mortgages worth

$1,226,886,314 as DB Collateral.  In reality, on June 30, 2009, BOA knew or should have

known that it held or had a lien on approximately $468 million in mortgages as DB Collateral.

d.  On July 20, 2009, BOA certified that it held mortgages worth $1,216,398,908

as DB Collateral.  In reality, on July 20, 2009, BOA knew or should have known that it held or

had a lien on approximately $476 million in mortgages as DB Collateral.

113. On information and belief, between June 30, 2008 and August 4, 2009, BOA

falsely certified that the Borrowing Base Condition was satisfied at least thirteen times when, in

fact, the Borrowing Base Condition was not satisfied.

114. Had BOA acted with due care in reviewing the Borrowing Base Condition,

BOA would have known that it could not certify and/or confirm that the Borrowing Base

Condition had been met.  By operation of the Ocala Agreements, the “circuit breaker” then

would have tripped, shutting down further financing and further purchases of mortgages and

minimizing losses to the collateral.  BOA’s failure to perform its obligations with respect to

reviewing, certifying, and confirming the Borrowing Base Condition prevented those

safeguards from taking effect, resulting in the loss of a substantial portion of DB’s investment.

E. BOA’s Failure to Segregate Loans and Proceeds

115. The Ocala Agreements required that DB’s investment and BNP’s investment be

kept separate.  This was necessary to ensure that the cash and collateral separately securing the

DB and BNP Secured Liquidity Notes would be identifiable.  If cash and collateral were not

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carefully and accurately identified and segregated, it would be difficult or impossible to know

which Secured Party had a secured interest in any particular cash or collateral, and the

possibility of competing claims could arise.

116. The Security Agreement contained provisions that, if adhered to, would preclude

any chance of such confusion or commingling of funds.  Pursuant to Section 5.01 of the

Security Agreement, BOA as Collateral Agent was required to maintain two distinct sub-

accounts of the Collateral Account; one relating to the Series 2005-1 Collateral (the BNP Sub-

Account) and the other relating to the Series 2008-1 Collateral (the DB Sub-Account).

117. Careful segregation by BOA of cash and collateral was essential not only to

identifying each Secured Party’s individual security interests, but also to key operational

aspects of the Ocala facility.

118. For example, most of the authorized purposes for which funds could be

transferred out of the Collateral Account pursuant to Section 5.03 of the Security Agreement

make reference to the specific DB and BNP Sub-Account from which funds can be drawn to

make such payment.

119. Most critically, Section 5.03 required that only funds from the DB Sub-Account

be used to fund the purchase of Series 2008-1 Mortgage Loans, and, similarly, that only funds

from the BNP Sub-Account be used to fund the purchase of Series 2005-1 Mortgage Loans.

120. Thus, as a practical matter it was also necessary for BOA as Collateral Agent,

Indenture Trustee, and Custodian to track whether mortgages being purchased correlated to

Series 2005-1 or Series 2008-1, because BOA had to ensure that funds were withdrawn from

the appropriate DB or BNP Sub-Account to purchase any given loan, and that the proceeds

from the sale of such a loan were deposited in the appropriate DB and BNP Sub-Account.

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121. BOA acted in disregard of its contractual duty to maintain the DB and BNP Sub-

Accounts separately, and to withdraw from and deposit into the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts the

appropriate funds.  On information and belief, BOA did not just commingle the accounts—it

made no meaningful attempt to segregate either mortgages purchased or the proceeds from sale of mortgages.

122. BOA’s failure to segregate appropriately the mortgages and funds became

evident after an event of default under the Base Indenture was declared in August 2009.  At that

time, BOA had not allocated between the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts what few mortgages and

funds remained in its possession.  BOA’s initial effort at allocation—a simple 50/50 split of

mortgages and funds between the two accounts (disregarding that DB’s investment was more

than twice the size of BNP’s investment) revealed the extent to which BOA had disregarded its

duties to keep loans and mortgages properly segregated.  BOA quickly withdrew that arbitrary

allocation.  To date, BOA has been unable or unwilling to make a proper allocation of the

mortgages and funds.

123. As a result of BOA’s failure to properly segregate the mortgages and funds,

BOA has impaired DB’s security interest in the mortgages and funds that should have properly

been segregated into the DB Sub-Account.  BOA’s continuing delay in allocating the

mortgages and funds has caused and continues to cause damage to DB.

VI. BOA’s Failure to Pay Amounts Due under the Secured Liquidity Notes

Following Ocala Default

124. On or about August 4, 2009, the FHA announced that it had disqualified TBW

from making FHA-insured loans, stating that TBW had failed to submit a required financial

report and to disclose certain irregular transactions that raised concerns of fraud.  Shortly

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thereafter, Freddie Mac and the Government National Mortgage Association terminated TBW

as a servicer of their mortgages and barred TBW from selling mortgages to them.

125. On August 4, 2009, the New York Times reported that the FBI and the Special

Inspector General of the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program had raided

Colonial and TBW.

126. On information and belief, on August 6, 2009, BOA requested that Colonial

return all of the loans held by Colonial pursuant to the BOA Bailee Letters.  The vast majority

of these loans had been out to Colonial on BOA Bailee Letters for more than 60 days, grossly

exceeding the fifteen-day limitation set forth in the BOA Bailee Letter.

127. On August 7, 2009, Colonial BancGroup disclosed that it was the target of a

criminal investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice relating to its mortgage lending unit

and related accounting irregularities, and that it might be placed under receivership.

128. On August 10, 2009, BOA as Indenture Trustee declared an indenture event of

default stating that the notes were due and payable because of TBW’s loss of approved seller status.

129. On August 14, 2009, Colonial was closed by the Alabama State Banking

Department, and the FDIC was named Receiver.

130. On August 20, 2009, the outstanding DB Secured Liquidity Notes in the amount

of $1,201,785,714 held by DB became immediately due and payable.  Ocala has failed to pay

this amount.

131. On August 24, 2009, TBW filed for relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United

State Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of

Florida.

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132. To date, BOA has failed to recover any DB Collateral and to pay the amounts

due to DB under the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

COUNT I

BREACH OF CONTRACT (SECURITY AGREEMENT)

133. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation above as if fully set

forth herein.

134. DB was expressly designated as a third-party beneficiary of the Security

Agreement.  Security Agreement §§ 10.08, 10.18.

135. BOA understood that a primary “purpose” of the Security Agreement was

“securing and providing for the repayment of all amounts at any time and from time to time

owing by the Issuer to each [Secured Party].”  Security Agreement at 1.

136. The Security Agreement created a continuing security interest in the Collateral

in favor of BOA for the benefit of the Secured Parties.  Security Agreement, Sched. III, § 1.

The Security Agreement provided that BOA, as Collateral Agent, was an agent of each of the

Secured Parties.  Id.

137. BOA was required to exercise due care in performing its duties under the

Security Agreement.  If BOA failed to perform those duties and/or was negligent in performing

those duties, the Security Agreement provides that BOA would be liable to DB for resulting

damages.

a. Pursuant to Section 4.10 of the Security Agreement, BOA is liable for

negligent actions taken or omitted to be taken by it relative to the DB Collateral.

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b. Pursuant to Section 8.01 of the Security Agreement, BOA is liable for

actions taken or omitted to be taken by it as Collateral Agent that are negligent, fraudulent, in

bad faith, or that constitute willful misconduct.

138. BOA breached its duties under the Security Agreement and was negligent in

performing those duties, including by:

a. Failing to ensure that the security interest it held on behalf of the Secured

Parties was perfected by obtaining written confirmation from Colonial that it had released any

security interest in mortgages for which BOA paid Colonial; and

b. Failing to keep accurate and adequately detailed records sufficient to

permit BOA to establish and prove with specificity the security interest it held on behalf of the

Secured Parties.

139. BOA violated the Security Agreement by transferring funds out of the Collateral

Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts to accounts and for purposes not specifically

permitted by the relevant provisions of the Security Agreement, including by:

a. Pursuant to Section 8.28 of the Base Indenture, BOA was aware that

Ocala was prohibited from using the proceeds of the Secured Liquidity Notes for any reason

other than (a) to pay obligations owed by Ocala under the Security Agreement to security

holders and (b) to acquire dry mortgages from TBW.

b. BOA was permitted to transfer funds only for the purposes established in

Sections 5.03(a) and (b) of the Security Agreement.  The sole purpose for which funds could be

transferred (other than in connection with the internal operation of the facility) was for the

purchase of dry mortgages.  BOA was aware that dry mortgages could be purchased only by

transfer of funds to the Colonial IFA Account.

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c. BOA transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to accounts that BOA

knew or should have known were unrelated to any of the purposes enumerated in Sections

5.03(a) and (b) of the Security Agreement.  Every transfer by BOA of funds out of the

Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts to such accounts violated Sections

5.03(a) and (b) of the Security Agreement.

d. BOA transferred more than $1.7 billion to the Wet Funding Account for

the purchase of wet mortgages when BOA knew that the Ocala Agreements prohibited the

purchase of wet mortgages.

140. BOA violated Sections 5.03(a) and (b) of the Security Agreement by

transferring funds out of the Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts when

BOA knew or should have known that the Borrowing Base Condition was not satisfied and that

funds in the Collateral Account and/or the DB and BNP Sub-Accounts could therefore not be

used to purchase mortgages.

141. BOA violated Sections 5.01 and 5.03 of the Security Agreement by failing to

properly segregate mortgages it purchased and funds it received from the sale of such

mortgages as between the DB Sub-Account and the BNP Sub-Account.

142. As a result of its contractual breaches, BOA directly and proximately caused the

loss of a substantial portion of the cash and mortgages from which Ocala was required to repay

the DB Secured Liquidity Notes, and to which DB would have had recourse in the event of a

failure by Ocala to repay the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

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COUNT II

BREACH OF CONTRACT (DEPOSITARY AGREEMENT)

143. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation above as if fully set

forth herein.

144. Pursuant to Section 8(g) of the Depositary Agreement, DB is a third party

beneficiary of the Depositary Agreement.  Section 8(g) specifically provides DB the right to be

indemnified for losses to Ocala caused by BOA’s negligence under the Depositary Agreement.

145. Furthermore, Section 15 of the Depositary Agreement provides that the

Indenture Trustee is a third-party beneficiary of the Depositary Agreement that may enforce its

provisions.  The Indenture Trustee is obligated to act for the benefit of the Secured Parties, but

BOA, as Indenture Trustee, is incapable of doing so here due to the fact that BOA has a conflict

and cannot sue itself.  Because BOA faces an irreconcilable conflict rendering it unable to carry

out its duty as Indenture Trustee, DB, as the beneficiary of the Base Indenture, is entitled to

assert the Indenture Trustee’s rights under Section 15 directly against BOA as Depositary.

146. BOA was required to exercise due care in performing its duties under the

Depositary Agreement.  If BOA was negligent in performing those duties, the Depositary

Agreement provides that BOA would be liable to DB for resulting damages.

a. Pursuant to Section 8(d) of the Depositary Agreement, BOA is liable for

actions taken or omitted to be taken by it as Depositary that are negligent, fraudulent, in bad

faith, or that constitute willful misconduct.

b. Pursuant to Section 8(d) of the Depositary Agreement, BOA must

indemnify DB against any losses sustained by the Issuer attributable to BOA’s negligence,

fraud, bad faith, or willful misconduct in the performance of its duties.

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c. Pursuant to Section 11(d) of the Depositary Agreement, BOA is liable

for errors in judgment made by in good faith by a responsible officer if BOA was negligent in

ascertaining the pertinent facts or in making such judgment based on available facts.

147. BOA breached its duties under the Depositary Agreement and was negligent in

performing those duties, including by:

a. Falsely certifying on a monthly basis that the Borrowing Base Condition

was satisfied pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement when BOA knew or should

have known that the Borrowing Base Condition had not been satisfied.

b. Improperly issuing on a monthly basis new Secured Liquidity Notes

pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement when BOA knew or should have known

that the Borrowing Base Condition had not been satisfied.

148. As a result of its contractual breaches, BOA directly and proximately caused the

loss of a substantial portion of the cash and mortgages from which Ocala was required to repay

the DB Secured Liquidity Notes, and to which DB would have had recourse in the event of a

failure by Ocala to repay the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

COUNT III

BREACH OF CONTRACT (CUSTODIAL AGREEMENT)

149. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation above as if fully set

forth herein.

150. The Custodial Agreement provides that DB is entitled to the rights and benefits

of the Custodial Agreement and may enforce the provisions of the Custodial Agreement as if it

were a party.  Custodial Agreement § 25.

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151. BOA was required to exercise due care in performing its duties under the

Custodial Agreement.  If BOA failed to perform those duties and/or was negligent in

performing those duties, the Custodial Agreement provides that BOA would be liable to DB for

resulting damages.

a. Pursuant to Section 19(c) of the Custodial Agreement, BOA is liable for

actions taken or omitted to be taken by it as Custodian that are negligent, fraudulent, in bad

faith, or that constitute willful misconduct.

b. Pursuant to Section 17 of the Custodial Agreement, BOA must

indemnify DB as a Secured Party against any losses sustained by Ocala attributable to the

Custodian’s negligence, fraud, bad faith, or willful misconduct in the performance of its duties

as Custodian.

c. Pursuant to Section 6(b)(i) of the Custodial Agreement, BOA was

required to maintain continuous custody and control of the Mortgages on behalf of Ocala

subject to the security interest of the Collateral Agent in accordance with customary standards

for such custody, and was liable for any loss resulting from the Custodian’s negligence or misconduct.

152. BOA violated Section 8 of the Custodial Agreement by either releasing

Mortgages to third-party purchasers without transmittal letters in the form specified by Exhibit

E to the Custodial Agreement and/or by failing to collect from the third-parties the executed

transmittal letters.

153. BOA violated Section 8 of the Custodial Agreement by failing to ensure that

prospective third-party purchasers to whom it had transmitted loans for purchase either returned

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the mortgages or remitted payment for the mortgages within the fifteen day time period set

forth in the required transmittal letters.

154. BOA breached its duties under the Custodial Agreement and was negligent in

performing those duties, including by:

a. Failing to obtain and/or keep records adequate to identify the mortgages

purchased by Ocala and held by BOA;

b. Failing to obtain and/or keep records adequate to demonstrate that

Colonial had released its security interest in mortgages for which BOA transferred payment to

Colonial and of which BOA took possession on behalf of Ocala;

c. Failing to ensure that with respect to mortgages released by BOA to

third-party purchasers as bailees, BOA recovered either the mortgage or the proceeds from the

sale of the mortgage; and

d. Misrepresenting to DB on a daily basis that BOA had custody and

control of DB Collateral over which it knew or should have known it did not have custody or control.

155. BOA negligently performed the daily reporting obligation it expressly undertook

to provide in connection with its performance under the Custodial Agreement.

156. As a result of its contractual breaches, BOA directly and proximately caused the

loss of a substantial portion of the cash and mortgages from which Ocala was required to repay

the DB Secured Liquidity Notes, and to which DB would have had recourse in the event of a

failure by Ocala to repay the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

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COUNT IV

INDEMNIFICATION

157. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein.

158. Pursuant to Section 8(g) of the Depositary Agreement, Section 17 of the

Custodial Agreement, and Section 8.05 of the Security Agreement, BOA must indemnify DB

against any losses attributable to the BOA’s negligence, fraud, bad faith, or willful misconduct

in the performance of its duties.

159. BOA was negligent in performing its duties as Depositary, Custodian and

Collateral Agent, including by:

a. Falsely certifying on a monthly basis that the Borrowing Base Condition

was satisfied pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement when BOA knew or should

have known that the Borrowing Base Condition had not been satisfied.

b. Improperly issuing on a monthly basis new Secured Liquidity Notes

pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Depositary Agreement when BOA knew or should have known

that the Borrowing Base Condition had not been satisfied.

c. Failing to obtain and/or keep records adequate to identify the mortgages

purchased by Ocala and held by BOA as Custodian;

d. Failing to obtain and/or keep records adequate to demonstrate that

Colonial had released its security interest in mortgages for which BOA transferred payment to

Colonial and of which BOA took possession on behalf of Ocala;

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e. Failing to ensure that with respect to mortgages released by BOA to

third-party purchasers as bailees, BOA either recovered the mortgage or the proceeds from the

sale of the mortgage; and

f. Providing false reports to DB indicating that BOA had custody and

control of DB Collateral over which it knew or should have known it did not have custody or control.

160. As a result of its negligence, BOA directly and proximately caused the loss of a

substantial portion of the cash and mortgages from which Ocala was required to repay the DB

Secured Liquidity Notes, and to which DB would have had recourse in the event of a failure by

Ocala to repay the DB Secured Liquidity Notes.

161. BOA is required to indemnify DB for this loss and has failed to do so.

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RELIEF REQUESTED

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment as follows:

a. An award of compensatory damages and other damages available by law

in an amount to be proved at trial, plus pre-judgment interest as permitted by law;

b. An award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, costs and other expenses; and

c. Such other and further relief as is just and proper.

Dated: November 25, 2009

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

By:

William E. McDaniels

Stephen D. Andrews

Stephen P. Sorensen

Daniel M. Dockery 

Katherine O’Connor (KL-0902)

725 Twelfth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Telephone: (202) 434-5000

Facsimile: (202) 434-5029

ssorensen@wc.com

sandrews@wc.com

ddockery@wc.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Deutsche Bank, AG

Case 1:09-cv-09784-UA     Document 1      Filed 11/25/2009     Page 44 of 44

Bank of America Seizes Paid up House! (this is how careful they are in Florida: courtesy of Mountain Sage Blog)

In studying this little story, I cannot decide whether the greater fault lies with Bank of America or the Hernando County Sheriff.  Do law enforcement officers have NO responsibility at all to verify the claims underlying any proposed seizure of property?  If they do not, then once again, is it really good and constitutional policy that we allow liars to be (even partially, temporarily) insulated by law merely by reporting to the police?   Official immunity is absurd!  The police have at least as many resources to verify claims as the Banks—and the use of the police should be conditioned on the police (Sheriff’s office/Constables/Marshal’s office, whatever!) commitment to double and tripled check all elements of a claim before acting using the state’s asserted monopoly on legitimate violence.

http://mountainsageblog.com/2010/02/14/bank-of-america-forecloses-on-house-that-couple-had-paid-cash-for/

Filed in Politics on Feb.14, 2010

A real estate agent employed by Bank of America told the bank that it had the wrong house.  The Cardosos lost the tenant and the personal possessions they had stored at the house.  I certainly hope that the Cardosos get a HUGE settlement from Bank of America.  There is NO excuse for this type of carelessness and incompetence.

As the recession continues, more and more corporations are taking advantage of Americans, from foreclosures to companies reducing pay, laying off workers and requiring employees to do the job of 5 people, to misclassifying employees as independent contractors to avoid paying minimum wage.  Where does it stop?

SPRING HILL — Charlie and Maria Cardoso are among the millions of Americans who have experienced the misery and embarrassment that come with home foreclosure.

Just one problem: The Massachusetts couple paid for their future retirement home in Spring Hill with cash in 2005, five years before agents for Bank of America seized the house, removed belongings and changed the locks on the doors, according to a lawsuit the couple have filed in federal court.

Early last month, Charlie Cardoso had to drive to Florida to get his home back, the complaint filed in Massachusetts on Jan. 20 states.

The bank had an incorrect address on foreclosure documents — the house it meant to seize is across the street and about 10 doors down — but the Cardosos and a Realtor employed by Bank of America were unable to convince the company that it had the wrong house, the suit states.

“Their own real estate agent told them, and nevertheless Bank of America steamrolled right ahead,” said Joseph deMello, an attorney in Taunton, Mass., who is representing the couple. “This is a nightmare for anyone, and it affected my hard-working clients a lot.”

The Cardosos are seeking unspecified damages from Bank of America. The company showed negligence, trespassed and caused the couple emotional distress and financial hardship, especially because a tenant renting the home at the time got worried and left, according to the complaint. It’s still unclear if the couple’s credit rating has been affected, deMello said.

REST  OF ARTICLE

County Record (click to enlarge) – The Hernando  County Property Appraiser records show the house was indeed purchased for $139,000. I redacted exact addresses to protect the privacy of the Cordosos.

Photobucket

Maybe next year, if the dollar goes into tripled-digit hyperinflation (e.g. like Zimbabwe today, Argentina in the 1980s, Germany in the 1920s, they’ll make Obama the first man in history to receive two Nobel Prizes in consecutive years by giving him the Nobel Prize in Economics….

It does seem strangely bizarre that Obama’s own supporters on the Democratic left (such as Salon.com’s editor in chief Joan Walsh) are struggling to defend Obama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize while apologizing “even as we acknowledge disappointment with Obama on State Secrets, Torture, Iraq, and Afghanistan” (you know, minor issues relating to world peace like those which constitute, well….just about everything he’s touched in the past nine months, see http://www.salon.com/opinion/walsh// for October 10, 2009), the rest of the Country is reeling from the sensation that this is all just a really bad joke, including my favorite commentator on civil rights and civil liberties, the author of How would a Patriot Act?.  The key quote from the article below is, in my opinion:

[Obama has] worked tirelessly to protect his country not only from accountability — but also transparency — for the last eight years of war crimes, almost certainly violating America’s treaty obligations in the process.  And he is currently presiding over an expansion of the legal black hole at Bagram while aggressively demanding the right to abduct people from around the world, ship them there, and then imprison them indefinitely with no rights of any kind.

All put together it makes me want to cry for my beloved but hopelessly insecure homeland, the United States of America, home of the zombie-like sleepwalkers and cowards who are letting this all happen (i.e., what seems like at least 75% of the population and maybe more)!  But seriously, what Obama is doing on the foreign front to protect the Bush legacy is nowhere nearly as sinister and corrupt as what he’s doing at home—pushing his domestic socialist agenda in cooperation with the corporate-financial giants, i.e. the international Banks, such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Chase just to name the top-three leading culprits, whose disregard for the fundamental elements of common law contract and property law is rapidly turning this country into a nation of homeless vagabonds….one foreclosure at a time, 70 foreclosures per morning and afternoon per session per county court, all across the United States, from sea to shining sea!

Glenn Greenwald

FRIDAY OCT. 9, 2009 07:10 EDT

(updated below – Update II)

When I saw this morning’s top New York Times headline — “Barack Obama Wins Nobel Peace Prize” — I had the same immediate reaction which I’m certain many others had:  this was some kind of bizarre Onion gag that got accidentally transposed onto the wrong website, that it was just some sort of strange joke someone was playing.  Upon further reflection, that isn’t all that far from the reaction I still have.  And I say that despite my belief that — as critical as I’ve been of the Obama presidency regarding civil liberties and Terrorism — foreign affairs is actually one area where he’s shown genuine potential for some constructive “change” and has, on occasion, merited real praise for taking steps in the general “peace” direction which this Prize is meant to honor.

Obama has changed the tone America uses to speak to the world generally and the Muslim world specifically.  His speech in Cairo, his first-week interview on al-Arabiya, and the extraordinarily conciliatory holiday video he sent to Iran are all substantial illustrations of that.  His willingness to sit down and negotiate with Iran — rather than threaten and berate them — has already produced tangible results.  He has at least preliminarily broken from Bush’s full-scale subservience to Israel and has applied steadfast pressure on the Israelis to cease settlement activities, even though it’s subjected him to the sorts of domestic political risks and vicious smears that have made prior Presidents afraid to do so.  His decision to use his first full day in office to issue Executive Orders to close Guantanamo, ostensibly ban torture, and bar CIA black sites was an important symbol offered to the world (even though it’s been followed by actions that make those commitments little more than empty symbols).  He refused to reflexively support the right-wing, civil-liberty-crushing coup leaders in Honduras merely because they were “pro-American” and “anti-Chavez,” thus siding with the vast bulk of Latin America’s governments — a move George Bush, or John McCain, never would have made.  And as a result of all of that, the U.S. — in a worldwide survey released just this week — rose from seventh to first on the list of “most admired countries.”

All that said, these changes are completely preliminary, which is to be expected given that he’s only been in office nine months.  For that reason, while Obama’s popularity has surged in Western Europe, the changes in the Muslim world in terms of how the U.S. is perceived have been small to nonexistent.  As Der Spiegel put it in the wake of a worldwide survey in July:  “while Europe’s ardor for Obama appears fervent, he has actually made little progress in the regions where the US faces its biggest foreign policy problems.”  People who live in regions that have long been devastated by American weaponry don’t have the luxury of being dazzled by pretty words and speeches.  They apparently — and rationally — won’t believe that America will actually change from a war-making nation into a peace-making one until there are tangible signs that this is happening.  It’s because that has so plainly not yet occurred that the Nobel Committee has made a mockery out of their own award.

But far more important than the lack of actual accomplishments are some of the policies over which Obama has presided that are the very opposite of peace.  Already this year, he not only escalated the American war in Afghanistan, but has ordered air raids that have produced things like this:

That was from a May airstrike in which over 100 Afghan civilians were killed by American jets — one of many similar incidents this year, including one only a week ago that killed 9 Afghan civilians.  How can someone responsible for that, and who has only escalated that war, possibly be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in the very same year that he did that?  Does that picture above look like the work of a Nobel Peace laureate?  Does this, from the May airstrike?

Beyond Afghanistan, Obama continues to preside over another war — in Iraq:  remember that? — where no meaningful withdrawal has occurred.  He uttered not a peep of opposition to the Israeli massacre of Gazan civilians at the beginning of this year (using American weapons), one which a U.N. investigator just found constituted war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity.  The changed tone to Iran notwithstanding, his administration frequently emphasizes that it is preserving the option to bomb that country, too — which could be a third war against a Muslim country fought simultaneously under his watch.  He’s worked tirelessly to protect his country not only from accountability — but also transparency — for the last eight years of war crimes, almost certainly violating America’s treaty obligations in the process.  And he is currently presiding over an expansion of the legal black hole at Bagram while aggressively demanding the right to abduct people from around the world, ship them there, and then imprison them indefinitely with no rights of any kind.

It’s certainly true that Obama inherited, not started, these conflicts.  And it’s possible that he could bring about their end, along with an overall change in how America interacts with the world in terms of actions, not just words.  If he does that, he would deserve immense credit — perhaps even a Nobel Peace Prize.  But he hasn’t done any of that.  And it’s at least as possible that he’ll do the opposite:  that he’ll continue to escalate the 8-year occupation of Afghanistan, preside over more conflict in Iraq, end up in a dangerous confrontation with Iran, and continue to preserve many of the core Bush/Cheney Terrorism policies that created such a stain on America’s image and character around the world.

Through no fault of his own, Obama presides over a massive war-making state that spends on its military close to what the rest of the world spends combined.  The U.S. accounts for almost 70% of worldwide arms sales.  We’re currently occupying and waging wars in two separate Muslim countries and making clear we reserve the “right” to attack a third.  Someone who made meaningful changes to those realities would truly be a man of peace.  It’s unreasonable to expect that Obama would magically transform all of this in nine months, and he certainly hasn’t.  Instead, he presides over it and is continuing much of it.  One can reasonably debate how much blame he merits for all of that, but there are simply no meaningful “peace” accomplishment in his record — at least not yet — and there’s plenty of the opposite.  That’s what makes this Prize so painfully and self-evidently ludicrous.

UPDATE:  Remember how, during the Bush years, the GOP would disgustingly try to equate liberals with Terrorists by pointing out that they happened to have the same view on a particular matter (The Left opposes the war in Iraq, just like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah do! or bin Laden’s criticisms of Bush sound just like Michael Moore’s! ).  It looks like the Democratic Party haslearned and adopted that tactic perfectly (“‘The Republican Party has thrown in its lot with the terrorists – the Taliban and Hamas this morning – in criticizing the President for receiving the Nobel Peace prize,’ DNC communications director Brad Woodhouse told POLITICO”; Republicans are “put[ting] politics above patriotism,” he added).

Apparently, according to the DNC, if you criticize this Prize, then you’re an unpatriotic America-hater — just like the Terrorists, because they’re also criticizing the award.  Karl Rove should be proud.  Maybe the DNC should also send out Joe Lieberman’s 2005 warning that “in matters of war we undermine Presidential credibility at our nation’s peril.”  Hamas also thinks that Israeli settlements should be frozen — a position Obama shares.  So, by the DNC’s Rovian reasoning, doesn’t this mean that Obama “has thrown in his lot with the terrorists”?

UPDATE II:  On Democracy Now, Naomi Klein calls Obama’s award “disappointing, cheapening of the Nobel Prize,” and adds:  “I think it’s quite insulting. I don’t know what kind of political game they’re playing, but I don’t think that the committee has ever been as political as this or as delusional as this, frankly.”  On Daily Kos, Michael Moore writes ironically:  “Congratulations President Obama on the Nobel Peace Prize — Now Please Earn it!”  Mairead Maguire, the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, says she’s “very disappointed” with this award, noting:  “President Obama has yet to prove that he will move seriously on the Middle East, that he will end the war in Afghanistan and many other issues.”   And my Salon colleague, Alex Koppelman, adds several thoughts about the efforts by the DNC and some Democratic groups to explicitly equate opposition to the Prize with “casting one’s lot with terrorists.”

Paragraph 5 of the August 29 2009 Bank of America Modification

In my opinion, Bank of America has admitted the truth of all my contentions regarding (1) the legality of mortgages and (2) the illegality of the “lenders'” positions in this business.  BAC has done so by inserting the following paragraph in the “Loan Modification Agreement” being circulated to “borrowers” as of August 29, 2009, at least in California:

“In consideration of this Modification, Borrower agrees that if any document related to the Security Instrument, Note, and/or Modification is lost, misplaced, misstated, inaccurately reflects the true and correct terms and conditions of the loan as modified, or is otherwise missing, Borrower(s) will comply with Lender’s request to execute, acknowledge, initial,  and deliver to Lender any documentation Lender deems necessary.  If the original promissory note is replaced the Lender hereby indemnifies the Borrower(s) against any loss associated with a demand on the original note.  All documents Lender requests of Borrower(s) shall be referred to as “Documents.”  Borrower agrees to deliver the documents within ten (10) days after receipt by Borrower(s) of a written request for such replacement.”

So now, what does all this mean?  Let’s start with the line “If the original promissory note is replaced the lender hereby indemnifies the Borrower(s) against any loss associated with a demand on the original note.”  To my ears and eyes, this constitutes a clear admission that (1) the original promissory note is necessary to the collection of the debt as a negotiable instrument under Federal Law, 100% of the time, (2) any “Borrower” who pays a penny on a note where the original note has been “lost, misplaced….or is otherwise missing” is paying on a debt s/he no longer owes or has any legal obligation to pay.

“In consideration of this Modification”—“Lender” is asking “Borrower” to give up certain VERY valuable rights, including (1) the right to sue for Fraud, (2) the right to assert privity of contract, (3) the right to assert Holder-in-Due Course Defense, (4) some if not all rights under RESPA and TILA, especially to the degree that the “modified” agreement permits the “Lender” UNILATERALLY to (a) determine “the true and correct terms and conditions of the loan as modified,” (b) not only require the Borrower unquestioningly to accept “the true and correct terms and conditions of the loan as modified”, but also [and equally unquestioningly] “to execute, acknowledge, initial and deliver to Lender any documentation Lender deems necessary.”  This is a “contract of adhesion” on top of a “contract of adhesion”—a unilateral and wholly oppressive domination of and manipulation by the “lender” against the “borrower”.   I BEG OF YOU—DO NOT SIGN ANY MODIFICATION WHICH CONTAINS THE LANGUAGE OF “PARAGRAPH 5” AS QUOTED ABOVE, NOR OF ANYTHING SIMILAR.  IT IS A TRAP.  You are being asked to give up ALL of your most valuable contractual rights!  But please, tell me all about your modification if it has this or any similar language—you may report all such incidents to my assistant Robert Joseph Ponte at 860-599-5557.

Charles Edward Lincoln, III

Deo Vindice

May God be with you, and with thy Spirit!

512-923-1889