Tag Archives: REMIC

Bank of America Slammed For Pursuing Nonexistent Debt and Filing False Foreclosure: Judgment for Borrower $204,000

Goodin v Bank of America N.A.

(with many thanks to J. Larry Nemec who forwarded this to me).

A Jacksonville federal judge has issued a sharp critique of Bank of America in a case involving a Jacksonville couple where the bank mishandled court filings and began a years-long process of trying to collect a non-existent debt and falsely filing for foreclosure.

Bank of America ruined their retirement, Deborah and Ronald Goodin testified, and it may have ruined their marriage, too.

The Goodins, like many American families, made a bad business decision just as the Great Recession began. By 2009, they filed for bankruptcy. They never missed a payment into a bankruptcy trust that was supposed to take care of their mortgage.

But then a year after taxpayers gave Bank of America a $45 billion bailout, that bank took over the mortgage from another lender in August 2009, and Bank of America, which handles trillions of dollars of deposits, failed to file a routine legal motion that would give it access to the bankruptcy trust.

BOA like the other banks is in pursuit of foreclosures for many reasons. They have no right to foreclosure and the real creditor is being blocked out of the equation. The so-called investor doesn’t even know the foreclosure was filed. And they are contractually stopped from even inquiring, just as the Trustees of the REMIC Trusts don’t know anything, don’t have anything and are not allowed to do anything or ask anything.

The plain truth is that BOA and other banks are pursuing foreclosures not because they are the lender or a successor to a lender or even an authorized representative of the real creditor. They are actually using the illusion of a default and foreclosure to cover up the fact that they are really suing for themselves — even if they are not the lender, the successor or authorized representatives. They are getting title to homes in which they have no investment.

SO THE FREE HOUSE IS GOING TO BOA AND OTHER BANKS, NOT THE BORROWER.

ORDERED:

1. Bank of America’s Motion to Amend Pleadings is DENIED.

2. The Court intends to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Ronald and Deborah Goodin and against Bank of America in the amount of $204,000 once attorneys’ fees have been decided. The Goodins have until July 15, 2015 to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, and Bank of America has until August 10, 2015 to respond.

DONE AND ORDERED

23 June 2015 Timothy J Corrigan Goodin v Bank of America Jacksonville Florida

Reference Info:Federal, 11th Circuit, Florida | United States

The true level of mortgage fraud is largely unknown…..STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FBI

Although there is no specific statute that defines mortgage fraud, each mortgage fraud scheme contains some type of material misstatement, misrepresentation or omission relied upon by an underwriter or lender to fund, purchase or insure a loan. The Mortgage Bankers Association projects 2.5 trillion in mortgage loans will be made this year. The FBI compiles data on mortgage fraud through Suspicious Activity Reports filed by financial institutions and HUD Office of the Inspector General reports. The FBI also receives complaints from the industry at large.

A significant portion of the mortgage industry is void of any mandatory fraud reporting. In addition, mortgage fraud in the secondary market is often underreported. Therefore, the true level of mortgage fraud is largely unknown. The mortgage industry itself does not provide estimates on total industry fraud. The industry provides incomplete or inconsistent fraud data. Based on various industry reports and FBI analysis, mortgage fraud is pervasive and growing.

The potential impact of mortgage fraud on financial institutions in the stock market is clear.  If fraudulent practices become systemic within the mortgage industry and mortgage fraud is allowed to become unrestrained, it will ultimately place financial institutions at risk and have adverse effects on the stock market. Investors may lose faith and require higher returns from mortgage-backed securities, which will result in higher interest rates and fees paid by borrowers, limiting the amount of investment funds available for mortgage loans.

Often mortgage loans sold in secondary markets are used by financial institutions as collateral for other investments. Repurchase agreements have been utilized by investors for protection against mortgage fraud. When loans sold in the secondary market default and have fraudulent or material misrepresentation, loans are repurchased by the lending financial institution based on a repurchase agreement. As a result, these loans become a nonperforming asset, and in extreme fraud cases, the mortgage-backed security is worthless. Mortgage fraud losses adversely affect loan loss reserves, profits, liquidity levels and capitalization ratios, ultimately affecting the soundness of the financial institution itself.

More INFO on Attorney Chris Swecker.

See the interview with Chris Swecker on CBS This Morning from 7/11/12. Click here.

Justice League

TESTIMONY OF CHRIS SWECKER BEFORE CONGRESS in 2004:

STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Although there is no specific statute that defines mortgage fraud, each mortgage fraud scheme contains some type of material misstatement, misrepresentation or omission relied upon by an underwriter or lender to fund, purchase or insure a loan. The Mortgage Bankers Association projects 2.5 trillion in mortgage loans will be made this year. The FBI compiles data on mortgage fraud through Suspicious Activity Reports filed by financial institutions and HUD Office of the Inspector General reports. The FBI also receives complaints from the industry at large.

A significant portion of the mortgage industry is void of any mandatory fraud reporting. In addition, mortgage fraud in the secondary market is often underreported. Therefore, the true level of mortgage fraud is largely unknown. The mortgage industry itself does not provide estimates on…

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REMICS | DID THE IRS CAUSE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS?

Justice League

As the dust from the financial crisis begins to settle, we learn that the lack of IRS enforcement of themortgage-backed securities industry bears blame for the financial crisis. The financial crisis began when lenders started making bad loans on a large-scale basis in the late ’90s and early ’00s. Big banks purchased these bad loans, bundled them into trusts, and sold interests in the trusts to investors worldwide. The interests in the trusts are mortgage-backed securities. The investors (financial institutions, pension and retirement plans, insurance companies, state and local governments and individuals) did not know the loans were bad, and paid inflated prices for the mortgage-backed securities. Now that the practices of lenders and banks are coming to light, borrowers and investors are seeking to recover losses through lawsuits. And it is obvious that better practices, as required by tax law and enforced through IRS audit, would have prevented or mitigated those losses.

Mortgage-backed securities are a vital part…

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No, Americans Are Not “All To Blame” for the Financial Crisis: Exposing the big lie of the post-crash economy

ECONOMY MARCH 9, 2014

The simple truth is that the Banks planned and consciously marketed the preconditions for the Mortgage Meltdown much more carefully designed, planned, and consciously marketed than any other destructive event in American History. The purpose was simply to fulfill the primary plank of the Communist Manifesto: to abolish all individual, family, and personal private property interests in real estate.  We have to get passed this whole notion that “we the people” are to blame.  We are the victims—let the perpetrators pay (and not live to be old rich men like those who marketed cigarettes knowing about the carcinogenic effects—or individual cars understanding the dangers both to individuals and the environment).

Among my favorite anecdotes of the mortgage-industry decadence that preceded the global financial crisis is the one about Ameriquest’s wind machine. A motivational tool for managers, it made its appearance in the late ’90s at an executive conference at Las Vegas’s MGM Grand Hotel, where the future subprime leader hooked up a powerful fan to a plastic tent. Inside, exuberant branch managers jumped around amid a cascade of cash, allowed to keep as many swirling bills as they could grab.

That was how it went at mortgage-firm retreats: Here, a money-grabbing contest; there, a round of ritual chanting—“The power of yes! The power of yes!”—at a 2004 Washington Mutual gathering that was like the high ceremony of some bizarre money cult. Before long such incentivizing was part of the daily culture, if not official policy. Countrywide, for example, had a marketing program called the “High-Speed Swim Lane” that linked the bonuses of sales reps working in football-field-sized call centers to the volume of loans they originated. Compressing the programs initials—and cutting to the chase—employees nicknamed it “The Hustle.”

Mere excess was never enough for these companies. Though we’re all aware, by now, of the crookedness that infected the mortgage business last decade, the particulars are still striking. Did you know, for instance, that WMC Mortgage Corporation, owned by General Electric, hired former strippers and an ex-porn actress to entice brokers into selling their mortgages, according to a report by the Center for Public Integrity? Or that Wells Fargo gave its mortgage stars all-expense-paid vacations to Cancun and the Bahamas and treated them to private performances by Aerosmith, the Eagles, and Elton John? Or that New Century sent top loan sales reps to Porsche driving school?

The upshot is clear enough: With Wall Street’s demand for mortgages unending and some loan producers managing to book up to 70 loans per day, the system didn’t just crash. It was brought down.

But we’ve also been made to understand that subprime lenders and their Wall Street funders didn’t act alone. Instead, they were aided by the avarice of the American people, who were not victims of the crash so much as accomplices in it. Respondents to a Rasmussen poll done during the throes of the crisis overwhelmingly blamed “individuals who borrowed more than they could afford” (54 percent) over Wall Street (25 percent). To this day, the view is widespread and bipartisan: Main Street was an essential cause of the meltdown. The enemy was us.

“It all goes back to the increase in the tolerance for debt,” David Brooks wrote a couple of years ago. The Brookings Institution, meanwhile, has argued that of all the possible crisis narratives, “ ‘everyone was at fault’ comes closest to the truth.” The “wider society” must face the music, it said in a 2009 paper. “People in all types of institutions and as individuals became blasé about risk-taking and leverage.”

Or, as Michael Lewis, our financial-writer laureate, observed: “The tsunami of cheap credit … was temptation, offering entire societies the chance to reveal aspects of their characters they could not normally afford to indulge.” Reveal themselves, they did, and it wasn’t pretty. Writing for Vanity Fair, Lewis quoted at length Dr. Peter Whybrow, a British neuroscientist at UCLA, who posited that human beings have “the core of the average lizard.” Lewis, running with the analogy, relayed Whybrow’s conclusion, which was that “the succession of financial bubbles, and the amassing of personal and public debt” were “simply an expression of the lizard-brained way of life.”

Is that not the truth?

Justice League

No, Americans Are Not All To Blame for the Financial Crisis: Exposing the big lie of the post-crash economy

 

mong my favorite anecdotes of the mortgage-industry decadence that preceded the global financial crisis is the one about Ameriquest’s wind machine. A motivational tool for managers, it made its appearance in the late ’90s at an executive conference at Las Vegas’s MGM Grand Hotel, where the future subprime leader hooked up a powerful fan to a plastic tent. Inside, exuberant branch managers jumped around amid a cascade of cash, allowed to keep as many swirling bills as they could grab.

That was how it went at mortgage-firm retreats: Here, a money-grabbing contest; there, a round of ritual chanting—“The power of yes! The power of yes!”—at a 2004 Washington Mutual gathering that was like the high ceremony of some bizarre money cult. Before long such incentivizing was part of the daily…

View original post 287 more words